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URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AND THE
ELIMINATION OF BLIGHT: A CASE




Since the early 1940s, publicly sponsored urban renewal programs
have beeen a vital part of the effort to improve the quality of life in
urban areas. As local governments realized that public housing pro-
grams alone could not arrest urban deterioration, they lobbied their
state legislatures for enabling legislation that would permit a broader
assault on urban problems. The earliest state urban renewal statutes
operated by providing tax incentives to urban redevelopment projects
and by permitting local governments to take land for redevelopment
under the eminent domain power. As a prerequisite to project ap-
proval, the statutes required local governments to determine that the
proposed redevelopment area was blighted.
The general goal of the early urban redevelopment statutes was to
improve the quality of life in urban areas. The means for accomplish-
ing this goal were less clear. While some viewed urban renewal as a
tool for eliminating slums and blighted areas and for developing qual-
ity housing for the urban poor, others considered slums and blighted
areas to be symptomatic of broader economic problems that urban ar-
eas faced. Thus, in contrast to a blight driven model of urban redevel-
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opment, an economic development model of urban redevelopment
contemplated the creation of jobs and the promotion of the local tax
base as the long term solution for urban decay.
Missouri enacted its first urban renewal statute in 1943.1 The legis-
lature repealed and reenacted the statute, known as the Urban Rede-
velopment Corporations Act, in 1945.2 The statute is now commonly
referred to by its place in the Missouri Revised Statutes-Chapter 353.
Chapter 353 has always been controversial and the earliest 353 projects
generated litigation.3 Recently, criticism of the statute has reached a
peak. The criticisms may be grouped roughly into three categories:
criticisms relating to the administration of the program and the alleged
failure of local governments to ensure developer compliance with rede-
velopment plans; criticisms relating to the failure of the program to
protect adequately the rights of residents in and neighbors of the rede-
velopment project area; and, finally, criticisms relating to the local gov-
ernment's blight determination and the use of Chapter 353 to
undertake economic development projects in areas that do not evidence
the traditional indicia of blight. Implicit in this last category of criti-
cism is a belief that the public benefits of economic development
projects that do not immediately remedy blight are speculative at best.
The purpose of this Article is to consider carefully whether Chapter
353 was meant to be blight driven; that is, whether the Missouri legisla-
ture enacted Chapter 353 to remedy obvious cases of blight, or whether
the legislature was equally concerned about promoting economic devel-
opment within urban areas generally. Part I of the Article describes
Chapter 353 and project approval under the statute. Part II examines
the criticisms of the statute and several of the studies that have evalu-
ated the effectiveness of Chapter 353. Next, Part III develops a legisla-
tive history for Chapter 353 in an effort to discern the objectives of the
statute. Part IV of the Article evaluates the use of Chapter 353 in light
of the public use doctrine, and Part V evaluates the use of the statute in
light of legal challenges to blight determinations. Finally, Part VI of
the Article develops conclusions about the proper role of blight deter-
minations in urban renewal programs.
1. 1943 Mo. Laws 751-69.
2. 1945 Mo. Laws 1249-51.
3. See, e.g., Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635
(Mo. 1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1966) (upholding a Chapter 353 blight deter-
mination and redevelopment project).
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PART I. AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 353
A. Introduction
In 1945, Missouri enacted the current version of the Urban Redevel-
opment Corporations Act, "Chapter 353."'4 Under this statute, rede-
velopment is accomplished through the combined efforts of the public
and private sectors. Under typical redevelopment statutes in other
states, the government acquires land for redevelopment through
purchase or eminent domain, clears the land, provides the necessary
infrastructure and sells or leases it to private developers. Public funds
are used to acquire, clear and assemble the land and to provide the
infrastructure for the development site. A portion of these costs is re-
covered when the land is leased or sold to the private sector. The por-
tion that is not recovered represents the "writedown" or public subsidy
that is deemed necessary to trigger the involvement of the private sec-
tor in the redevelopment project. Chapter 353 is similar to redevelop-
ment statutes in other states except that it permits the local
government to delegate its eminent domain power to a private redevel-
opment corporation. In addition, Chapter 353 authorizes substantial
real property tax exemptions and abatements to encourage
redevelopment.
This part of the Article reviews the structure of Chapter 353 and
outlines the procedures for initiating and implementing a redevelop-
ment project. When appropriate, it examines Missouri case law con-
struing various provisions of Chapter 353.
B. Coverage of Chapter 353
In 1988, the Missouri legislature amended Chapter 353 and extended
its coverage. Prior to the amendment, Chapter 353 applied to all cities
that in the preceding federal decennial census had a population of four
thousand or more and to all constitutional charter cities.5 The statute
now permits constitutional charter cities and cities with a population of
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.010 - .180 (1986 & Supp. 1988). The Missouri constitu-
tional provision authorizing local urban redevelopment programs expressly authorized
constitutional charter counties and cities to enact ordinances providing for urban re-
newal, and also authorized the legislature to enact statutes providing for urban renewal.
Mo. Const. art. VI, § 21. Thus, it would appear that constitutional charter counties and
cities derive their authority to undertake urban renewal directly from the state constitu-
tion, while other local governments must derive their authority from a state statute
Chapter 353.
5. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.010 (1986).
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4,000 or more located in counties with a charter form of government to
engage in urban redevelopment through private corporations.6 In ad-
dition, Chapter 353 also empowers municipalities that in the preceding
federal decennial census had a population of 2,500 located in counties
without a charter form of government redevelop their cities.7
C. The Redevelopment Corporation
A redevelopment corporation must be organized under the provi-
sions of Chapter 353 to be eligible for urban redevelopment tax benefits
and use of the government's eminent domain power.8 Life insurance
companies also may undertake urban redevelopment projects.9 Section
353.030 requires certain contents in the articles of agreement or associ-
ation of a redevelopment corporation in addition to those generally re-
quired of Missouri for-profit corporations. 0 The articles must contain
the following information: (1) the name of the corporation, which
must include the words "redevelopment corporation;"'" (2) the pur-
6. Id. § 353.010 (Supp. 1988).
7. Id.
8. Id. §§ 353.020(10), .110 (1986). Section 353.020(10) defines an urban redevelop-
ment corporation as "a corporation under the provision of this chapter" and section
353.110 provides that:
[o]nce the requirements of this section have been complied with, the real prop-
erty of urban redevelopment corporations acquired pursuant to this chapter shall
not be subject to assessment or payment of general ad valorem taxes imposed by
the cities affected by this law, or by the state or any political subdivision thereof,
for a period not in excess of ten years .....
9. Id. §§ 353.020(10), 353.040. Section 353.020(10) provides in the definition of
urban redevelopment corporation that:
any life insurance company organized under the laws of, or admitted to do busi-
ness in, the state of Missouri may from time to time... undertake... a redevelop-
ment project under this chapter, and shall, in its operations with respect to any
such redevelopment project, but not otherwise, be deemed to be an urban redevel-
opment corporation ....
In addition, § 353.040 provides that:
[a]ny life insurance company operating as an urban redevelopment corporation
under this chapter shall be limited in its net earnings derived exclusively from the
ownership or operation of any redevelopment project .. to an amount not to
exceed eight percent per annum of the cost to such company of the redevelopment
project ....
10. Id. § 353.010-.720.
11. Mo. REv. STAT. 353.030(l). The section provides: "The name of the proposed
corporation ... must have the words 'redevelopment corporation' as a part thereof."
Id. Only redevelopment corporations under Chapter 353 may use the word "redevelop-
ment" in their names.-)d. § 353.050.
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poses for which the corporation is formed, namely to acquire, con-
struct, maintain and operate redevelopment project(s) in accordance
with the provisions of the statute;12 (3) a declaration that the corpora-
tion is organized to serve a public purpose and that real estate acquired
by it and buildings erected by it are intended to promote the public
health, safety and welfare, and that the stockholders agree that the net
earnings of the corporation will not exceed eight percent of the cost of
the redevelopment project to the corporation per year; 3 and (4) a dec-
laration that the corporation is organized for the clearance, replanning,
reconstruction and rehabilitation of blighted areas and the construction
of appropriate industrial, commercial, residential or public
structures.14
In addition, the duration of the corporation may not exceed ninety-
nine years; it must have at least three but no more than thirteen direc-
tors; the articles must contain the names and addresses of the subscrib-
ers; and any holders of debenture certificates must have voting rights.' 5
12. Id. § 353.030(2). The section provides: "The purposes for which it is formed
which shall be as follows: To acquire, construct, maintain and operate a redevelopment
project or redevelopment projects in accordance with the provisions of this law." Id
13. Id. § 353.030(11). The section provides:
The articles of agreement or association ... shall contain... [a] declaration that
the corporation has been organized to serve a public purpose; that all real estate
acquired by it and all structures erected by it are to be acquired for the purpose of
promoting the public health, safety and welfare, and that the stockholders of the
corporation shall when they subscribe to and receive the stock thereof, agree that
the net earnings of the corporation shall be limited to an amount not to exceed
eight percent per annum of the cost to such corporation of the redevelopment pro-
ject ....
Id.
14. Id. § 353.030 (12). The section provides:
The articles of agreement or association.., shall contain ... [a] declaration that
such corporations are organized for the purpose of the clearance, replanning, re-
construction or rehabilitation of blighted areas, and the construction of such indus-
trial, commercial, residential or public structures as may be appropriate, including
provisions for recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto.
Id.
15. Id. § 353.030. The section provides:
The articles of agreement or association ... shall contain...
(6) Its duration, which shall not exceed ninety-nine years.
(7) The n~xmber of directors which shall not be less than three, nor more than
thirteen....
(9) The names and post-office addresses of the subscribers to the articles of asso-
ciation or agreement.
(10) A provision that in the event that income debenture certificates are issued
by the corporation, the owners thereof shall have the same right to vote as they
1990)
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Furthermore, the statute requires notice to holders of debentures of
any proposed action on which they have voting rights.16 The statute
also prohibits the use of the word "redevelopment" in a corporate
name by a domestic corporation unless the corporation is organized
under Chapter 353.7 Similarly, the statute prohibits foreign corpora-
tions that have the word "redevelopment" as part of their names from
doing business in Missouri. 8 The articles of agreement or association
must be filed with the office of the Secretary of State.' 9
Although the net earnings of a redevelopment corporation may not
exceed eight percent per year of the cost of the redevelopment project,
this excess is calculated after the payment of maintenance costs, taxes,
assessments, insurance and similar charges.20 Also, any surplus earn-
ings over eight percent may be held in reserve for future maintenance,
used to offset any deficiency which may have occurred in prior years,
placed in a sinking fund or used for the enlargement of the project."1
would have if possessed of certificates of stock of the amount and par value of the
income debenture certificate held by them.
Id.
16. Id. § 353.080. The section provides: "In the event that any action with respect
to which the holders of income debentures shall have the right to vote is proposed to be
taken, notice of any meeting at which such action is proposed to be taken shall be given
to such holders . I..." d.
17. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.050. The section provides: "No corporation now organ-
ized under the laws of this state shall change its name to a name, and no such corpora-
tion hereafter organized shall have a name, containing the word 'redevelopment' as a
part thereof except as provided in this chapter." Ida
18. Id. § 353.050. The section provides: "No foreign corporation now authorized
to do business in this state shall change its name to a name, and no such corporation
shall hereafter be authorized to do business in the state with a name, containing the
word 'redevelopment' as a part thereof." Id.
19. d § 353.030. The section provides: "The articles of agreement or association
shall be prepared, subscribed and acknowledged, and filed in the office of the secretary
of state pursuant to the general corporations laws of the state .... " Id.
20. Id. § 353.030 (11). The section provides: "Such net earnings shall be com-
puted after deducting from gross earnings the following: (a) All costs and expenses of
maintenance and operation; (b) Amounts paid for taxes, assessments, insurance premi-
ums and other similar charges .... " Id.
21. Id. § 353.030(11)(c). The section provides:
The development plan may contain provisions satisfactory to the legislative author-
ity authorizing such plan that any surplus earnings in excess of the rafe of the net
earnings provided in this chapter may be held by the corporation as a reserve for
maintenance of such rate of return in the future and may be used by the corpora-
tion to offset any deficiency in such rate of return which may have occurred in
prior years; or may be used to accelerate the amortization payments; or for the
enlargement of the project; or for reduction in rentals therein ....
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/2
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Any excess of these surplus earnings remaining at the termination of
the tax relief period must be turned over to the city.22 Insurance com-
panies that operate as redevelopment corporations also are subject to
this limited earnings rule.2 3 The statute further prohibits payment of
interest on debentures or dividends on stock unless all amortized debts
are current and unless all current public charges are paid or a reserve is
established for the payment of those charges.24
D. Requirements for Project Approval
A redevelopment corporation may propose and initiate a Chapter
353 development plan for the development of all or any part of a
blighted area.2 5 A redevelopment corporation cannot operate unless
the legislative authority2 6 of the city having jurisdiction over the af-
fected property authorizes the plan.2 7 After approving the plan,28 the
Id.
See also § 353.090 which provides that: "An urban redevelopment corporation shall
establish and maintain depreciation, obsolescence, and other reserves, also surplus and
other accounts, including, among others, a reserve for the payment of taxes according to
recognized standard accounting practices."
22. Id. § 353.030(1 l)(c). The section provides: "[A]ny excess of such surplus earn-
ings remaining at the termination of the tax relief granted pursuant to section 353.110
shall be turned over by the corporation to the city."
23. Id. § 353.040. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
24. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.100 provides:
No urban redevelopment corporation shall pay any dividend interest on its income
debentures or dividends on its stock during any year unless there shall exist at the
time of such payment no default under any amortization requirements with respect
to its indebtedness, nor unless all accrned interest, taxes and other public charges
shall have been duly paid or reserves set up for the payment thereof, and adequate
reserves provided for depreciation, obsolescence and other proper reserves.
Id.
25. Id. § 353.020(4) (Supp. 1988). The section provides: "'Development plan'
shall mean a plan, together with any amendments thereto, for the development of all or
any part of a blighted area, which is authorized by the legislative authority of any such
city . .." Id. Section 353.020(8) provides: "'Redevelopment' shall mean the clear-
ance, replanning, reconstruction or rehabilitation of any blighted area, and the provi-
sion of such industrial, commercial, residential or public structures and spaces as may
be appropriate, including recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant
thereto .... " Id. § 353.020(8). Section 353.020(9) provides: "'Redevelopment pro-
ject' shall mean a specific work or improvement to effectuate all or any part of a devel-
opment plan . . . ." Id. § 353.020(9).
26. Id. § 353.020(4). See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
27. Id. § 353.060 provides:
An urban redevelopment corporation shall operate under this chapter on one or
more redevelopment projects pursuant to an authorized development plan, and
1990]
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legislative authority, by city ordinance, may grant to the redevelop-
ment corporation any rights, powers, duties, immunities and obliga-
tions not inconsistent with the statute.29 This grant of power to the
redevelopment corporation may occur only after a public hearing at
which all of the property owners affected by the project are entitled to
be present and to comment.
30
Following the public hearing, the legislative authority must find that
the redevelopment area is blighted as a precondition to commencement
of a project.3  A blighted area is an area that the legislative authority
determines "that by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmo-
ded design or physical deterioration, have [sic] become economic and
social liabilities, and that such conditions are conducive to ill health,
transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay reasonable taxes."32
The legislative authority may approve a development plan for an area
which includes buildings or real property33 that are not in themselves
blighted but necessarily are included for the overall improvement of
the area.34
with respect to each such project shall have such rights, powers, duties, immunities
and obligations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this law, as may be con-
ferred upon it by city ordinance duly enacted by the legislative authority of a city
affected by this chapter which is authorizing or has authorized such plan.
Id.
28. The statute defines legislative authority as city council or board of aldermen.
Id. § 353.020(5) (Supp. 1988).
29. Id. § 353.060 (1986). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
30. Id. § 353.060. The section provides:
[N]o such right or powers... shall be granted by any governing authority to any
urban redevelopment corporation ... unless the governing authority shall hold a
public hearing for the stimulation of comment by those to be affected by any such
grant and shall determine thereafter that the area covered by the plan is blighted
Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 353.020(2)(Supp. 1988).
33. Id. § 353.020(7). The section provides:
"Real property" shall include lands, buildings, improvements, land under water,
waterfront property, and any and all easements, franchises and hereditaments, cor-
poreal or incorporeal, and every estate, interest, privilege, easement, franchise and
right therein, or appurtenant thereto, legal or equitable, including restrictions of
records, created by plat, covenant, or otherwise, rights-of-way, and terms for years
Id.
34. Id. § 353.020(1). The section provides:
Any such area may include buildings or improvements not in themselves blighted,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/2
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The legislative authority has wide discretion when making a finding
of blight because that determination is an exercise of legislative power.
Consequently, courts will overturn the determination only if it is arbi-
trary and capricious." In Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civic Redevelop-
ment Corp., the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the courts cannot
interfere with the legislative authority's discretionary exercise of judg-
ment in determining the existence of blight.3 6 The court reasoned that
and any real property, whether improved or unimproved, the inclusion of which is
deemed necessary for the effective clearance, replanning, reconstruction or rehabili-
tation of the area of which such buildings, improvements or real property form a
part...
Id.
In Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Greenberg, 594 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979), the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld a declaration of blight even though
the area contained structures that did not fall within the definition of blight. Maryland
Plaza involved the redevelopment of the Maryland Plaza area in St. Louis and a chal-
lenge to the Board of Aldermen's determination of blight. After approval of the rede-
velopment plan, the redevelopment corporation filed condemnation proceedings against
respondents, owners of three tracts within the area. Id. at 285-86. Respondents argued
that the area was not blighted because it contained properties which in themselves were
not blighted. Id. at 288. The court rejected this argument and held that an area may be
blighted even though it contains structures which would not fall within the definitional
ambit of blight. Id. It reached this decision by relying on Section 353.020(1). Id. The
court also relied on the City Plan Commission's study that disclosed that 60% of the
structures in the area needed significant repairs and that the assessed valuation of the
property had decreased over 15% in a ten-year period. Id. See also State on Inf. Dalton
v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority, 270 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1954) (en banc).
Parking Systems, Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518 S.W.2d
11, 15 (Mo. 1974). In Parking Systems, the redevelopment corporation obtained ap-
proval of a plan for the redevelopment of an area in Kansas City. Id. at 13-14. The
plaintiffs brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 353 and the city's
determination of blight. Id. at 14. Plaintiffs challenged the determination of blight on
the grounds that: open land constituted 49% of the property; surface parking lots cur-
rently occupied 47% of the property; no further clearance or redevelopment was needed
of the 49% open land; only 28% of buildings which occupied only 14% of the entire
area were deteriorated or substandard to the degree requiring clearance; and the struc-
tural deficiencies were insufficient to qualify the project as blighted. Id. at 14. The
court upheld the blight determination. It relied on other state court decisions holding
that an area may be declared blighted even though it contains vacant land. Id. at 15.
The court stated that a challenge to the determination of blight only can be made on the
grounds that the city council acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Id.
35. Parking Systems Inc., 518 S.W.2d at 15.
36. 538 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Mo.)(en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976). In All-
right Missouri, plaintiffs brought suit challenging the City Council's adoption of an ordi-
nance declaring an area blighted after the City Plan Commission's recommendation
that the plan be disapproved. Id. at 322. Prior to its approval, the City Council re-
ferred the plan to the City's Committee on Plans and Zoning for its recommendation.
Id. After conducting an investigation and hearings, the committee recommended that
1990]
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"[u]nless it should appear that the conclusion of the City's legislative
body in the respect in issue ... is clearly arbitrary .... we cannot
substitute our opinion for that of the City's."37 The burden of proving
that the determination is arbitrary rests on the party challenging the
determination.38 The legislative body also may declare an area
blighted despite a contrary recommendation by the city planning com-
mission3 9 because the authority and responsibility for making the de-
termination is vested exclusively with the legislative body.'
In addition to making a finding of blight, the legislative authority
must determine that the redevelopment project is for a public purpose.
This finding is consistent with Chapter 353's requirement that the rede-
velopment corporation serve a public purpose and that it acquire land
and erect buildings to promote public health, safety and welfare.4' In
addition, this public purpose finding serves as a basis for the exercise of
the eminent domain power.42
Missouri courts also have deferred to the legislative authority's find-
ing of public purpose. In Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelop-
ment Corp., 3 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the legislative
the plan be approved and the area determined blighted. Id. at 323. Upon this recom-
mendation, the City Council approved the plan and adopted an ordinance declaring the
area blighted. Id. Allright challenged the determination of blight on the grounds that
there was no factual basis for it and that the City Plan Commission's disapproval was
conclusive evidence that the area was not blighted, therefore making the finding of
blight arbitrary and capricious. Id. The court rejected Allright's argument that the
Commission's disapproval of the project was conclusive evidence that the area was not
blighted because the authority for making that determination is vested exclusively with
the city's legislative body and not the commission. Id. at 324.
37. Id. (quoting Parking Sys., Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment
Corp., 518 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1974)).
38. Id.
39. Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Greenberg, 594 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979).
40. Allright Missouri, 538 S.W.2d at 324 (citing Parking Sys., Inc. v. Kansas City
Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518 S.W.2d 11, 17-18 (Mo. 1974)).
41. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.030(11) (1986). See supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
42. Id. § 353.130(2). The section provides: "An urban redevelopment corporation
shall have the right to acquire by the exercise of the power of eminent domain any real
property in fee simple... only when so empowered by the legislative authority of the
cities affected by this chapter." Id.
43. 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1965) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1966).
Annbar involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Chapter 353 and other Kansas
City ordinances regulating redevelopment projects. Id. at 637-38. Plaintiff also sought
injunctive relief to prevent defendant West Side Redevelopment Corp. from proceeding
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/2
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authority's determination that certain property was blighted and its de-
termination that a subsequent sale was in the public interest is accepta-
ble as conclusive evidence that a proper public use existed and that the
redevelopment project did not violate the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution." Furthermore, the court held that a sub-
sequent conveyance of the redevelopment property to private interests
did not convert a public use into a private use4 5 and that it would
overturn the legislative authority's finding of public purpose only when
that finding is arbitrary or induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith.4 6
The Missouri Court of Appeals held in Schweig v. Maryland Plaza Re-
development Corp. that a public use remains even when the redevelop-
ment corporation contemplates no significant change in the use of the
property it acquires but merely changes ownership from one private
entity to another.4 7 The court stated that the buildings' end use is ir-
relevant to determine whether the taking is for public use, and instead
focused on whether the taking aids redevelopment of the blighted
area.
4 8
When reviewing a proposed development plan, the legislative au-
thority also must decide whether the redevelopment corporation's fi-
nancial plan for the project is adequate. If the determination of the
legislative body is fairly debatable, a court will not hold the ordinance
to be arbitrary and void.4 9
with its redevelopment project. Id. at 638. West Side proposed to redevelop an area
located between Pennsylvania Avenue and Washington Street on the east and west and
Seventh Street and Tenth Street on the north and south. Id. It also included a small
area at the intersection of Ninth and Washington Streets. Id. The entire redevelopment
area was known as Quality Hill. Id.
44. Id. at 646 (quoting State on Inf Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment
Authority, 270 S.W.2d 44, 49-52 (Mo. 1954) (en banc)).
45. Id. The court reasoned that the statute's primary purpose is redevelopment and
that the benefits to private individuals are only secondary. Id. (quoting State on Inf
Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority, 270 S.W.2d 44, 53 (Mo. 1954)
(en banc)).
46. Id.
47. 676 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Schweig involved a second challenge
to the redevelopment project previously litigated in Maryland Plaza. Id. at 251. See
supra note 34 and accompanying text for a description of the development plan at issue.
In the instant case, plaintiffs challenged the acquisition of their property on the grounds
that the acquisition was not necessary to accomplish the rehabilitation. Id. at 252.
Maryland Plaza intended to acquire the well-maintained property and continue to use it
for rental property without renovation or a change in tenants. Id.
48. Id. at 253.
49. Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civic Redevelopment Corp., 538 S.W.2d 320, 325
1990]
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Under Chapter 353, a redevelopment corporation may borrow funds
for the development project and secure the repayment of the funds by a
mortgage.50 The mortgage must contain reasonable amortization pro-
visions and can only be a lien on real property that forms the whole or
a part of a development area.51 In addition, certificates, bonds and
notes secured by a first mortgage on the real property in the develop-
ment area may be issued.52 A redevelopment corporation also may
obtain project funding from various sources, including grants or loans
from the federal government or any federal agency or department.53 A
determination of whether the parties are financially responsible is
vested with the legislative authority. 4
The courts also defer to the legislative determination that the financ-
ing statement is sufficiently detailed absent clear proof that the plan
was arbitrary or the result of fraud, collusion or bad faith.55 Although
the plan need not contain statements of committed financing or finan-
ciers, the Missouri Court of Appeals has held that the plan must con-
tain a detailed description of the redeveloper's proposals to obtain the
money to redevelop the project. Such proposals must be more than a
(Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); Annbar Associates v. West Side
Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 655 (Mo. 1965) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 385
U.S. 5 (1966); Schweig v. Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 676 S.W.2d 249, 256
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984); and State ex rel. Devanssay v. McGuire, 622 S.W.2d 323, 327
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
50. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.150 (1) (1986). The section provides: "Any urban rede-
velopment corporation may borrow funds and secure the repayment thereof by mort-
gage which shall contain reasonable amortization provisions and shall be a lien upon no
other real property except that forming the whole or a part of a single development
area." Id. This provision only limits the redevelopment corporation when it uses the
real property within the development plan as security. It does not preclude the
redeveloper from pledging other property of the redevelopment corporation as the se-
curity on the debt of the redevelopment corporation.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 353.150(2). The section provides:
Certificates, bonds and notes or part interest therein, or any part of an issue
thereof, which are secured by a first mortgage on the real property in a develop-
ment area, or any part thereof, shall be securities in which all the following per-
sons, partnerships, or corporations and public bodies or public officers may legally
invest funds within their control...
Id.
53. Id. § 353.160.
54. Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 655




"wish list."56 The redeveloper must submit a sufficiently detailed plan
to provide a basis for the legislative body to determine its feasibility.
When the legislative authority considers the feasibility of the plan, it
also may consider parol evidence that subsequently may be relied upon
by a reviewing court to determine whether the action of the legislative
authority was fairly debatable. 7
E. Benefits of Urban Redevelopment Corporations
1. Eminent Domain Power
A redevelopment corporation may acquire property for redevelop-
ment by gift, grant, lease, purchase or through the power of eminent
domain. 8 Upon approval of the development plan, the legislative au-
thority may delegate its eminent domain power to the redevelopment
corporation. 9 This power allows the corporation to acquire real prop-
erty in fee simple or any estate necessary to accomplish the redevelop-
ment purposeY° The corporation may exercise eminent domain under
any applicable Missouri statutory provision.61 Land already devoted
56. State ex rel. Devanssay v. McGuire, 622 S.W.2d 323, 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
The suit challenged the suit for condemnation initiated by Waterman Redevelopment
Corp. Id. at 324. St. Louis approved Waterman's development plan to redevelop a
block of property located on Waterman Avenue and containing Devanssay's property.
Id. Devanssay challenged the ordinance granting eminent domain power to Waterman
on the grounds that it was arbitrary and void because it did not contain a detailed
statement of proposed financing, Id. The plan submitted by Waterman listed various
methods of prospective financing for various aspects of the project. In addition, it
stated that Waterman and its affiliated companies had $400,000 in equity in the devel-
opment area with the costs of acquisition of the additional properties only being
$40,000. Id. at 327. In Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Greenberg, however,
the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held the Board of Alderman's
approval of a development plan arbitrary on the grounds that the plan did not contain a
detailed financing plan. 594 S.W.2d 284, 290 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). The financing state-
ment at issue was a letter containing only statements such as "debt financing will be on
a structure by structure basis" or "the cost of public areas will be assigned proportion-
ately to each structure." Id.
57. Devanssay, 622 S.W.2d at 327.
58. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.130 (1986).
59. Id. § 353.130(2); see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
60. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.130(2)(1986).
61. Id. § 353.130(3). The section provides: "An urban redevelopment corporation
may exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided for corporations in
chapter 523, R.S.Mo.; or it may exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner
provided by any other applicable statutory provision for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain." Id.
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to a public purpose may be acquired through condemnation; however,
property belonging to any city, county or the state, or any political
subdivision may not be acquired without its consent. 62
In Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis,63 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that the city's
grant of the eminent domain power to the redevelopment corporation
makes the corporation, not the city, the condemnor. The court rea-
soned that because the corporation was pursuing its own for-profit
plans within the broader societal goal to eliminate blight, it was not an
agent of the city; the city's delegation of the eminent domain power did
not establish the city as the principal condemnor."
The Missouri Supreme Court earlier upheld the constitutionality of
the delegation of the eminent domain power to private corporations in
Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp.6' The court re-
fused to "second guess the legislative branch of government as to what
bodies may be invested with the power of eminent domain ' 66 and also
declined to distinguish between the power granted redevelopment cor-
porations and that granted to railroads and others to carry on a busi-
ness necessary to serve the public.
67
2. Tax Exemption and Abatement
An approved redevelopment project is entitled to tax exemption
from and abatement for real property taxes.68 Under the tax exemp-
tions in Chapter 353, real property acquired is taxed exclusive of im-
provements for a period not to exceed 10 years. The assessment level
remains at the level applicable to the property during the calendar year
preceding its acquisition by the redevelopment corporation "so long as
62. Id. § 353.130 (3): "Property already devoted to a public use may be acquired in
like manner, provided that no real property belonging to any city, county, or the state,
or any political subdivision thereof may be acquired without its consent." Id.
63. 492 F. Supp. 402, 405 (E.D. Mo. 1980). Garland involved a challenge to an
ordinance adopted by St. Louis granting Mercantile Center Redevelopment Corpora-
tion eminent domain power for its approved development plan for a six block area. Id.
at 403. Plaintiff argued that the actions taken by Mercantile acted as an agent for the
city as a consequence of the city's grant of eminent domain to Mercantile and that the
city should be held liable for these actions. Id. at 404.
64. Id. at 405; see also Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979).
65. 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1965)(en banc), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1966).
66. Id. at 647.
67. Id.
68. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.110 (1986).
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the real property is owned by an urban redevelopment corporation and
used in accordance with" an authorized development plan.69 If the
property acquired by the urban redevelopment corporation was tax ex-
empt prior to its acquisition, the assessed valuation of the property will
conform to the assessed valuation of adjacent property, exclusive of
improvements, for the calendar year preceding the acquisition.70 After
the tax-exempt period, Chapter 353 provides a tax abatement which
bases the property tax upon not more than half of the assessed valua-
tion of the property and any improvements for a period of not more
than fifteen years.71 Thus, although a redevelopment corporation is
69. Id. § 353.110.1. The section provides:
[T]he real property of urban redevelopment corporations acquired pursuant to this
chapter shall not be subject to assessment or payment of general ad valorem taxes
... for a period not in excess of ten years after the date upon which such corpora-
tions become owners of such real property, except to such extent and in such
amount as may be imposed upon such real property during such period measured
solely by the amount of the assessed valuation of land, exclusive of improvements
... for taxes due and payable thereon during the calendar year preceding the calen-
dar year during which the corporation acquired title to such real property. The
amounts of such tax assessments shall not be increased during such period so long
as the real property is owned by an urban redevelopment corporation and used in
accordance with a development plan authorized by the legislative authority of such
cities.
Id.
70. Id. § 353.110.2. The section provides:
In the event, however, that any such real property was tax exempt immediately
prior to ownership by an urban redevelopment corporation, [the assessor] shall...
promptly assess such land, exclusive of improvements, at such valuation as shall
conform to but not exceed the assessed valuation made during the preceding calen-
dar year of other land, exclusive of improvements, adjacent thereto or in the same
general neighborhood ...
Id.
71. Id. § 353.110.2. The section provides:
For the next ensuing period not in excess of fifteen years, ad valorem taxes upon
such real property shall be measured by the assessed valuation thereof as deter-
mined by such assessor or assessors upon the basis of not to exceed fifty percent of
the true value of such real property, including any improvement thereon, nor shall
such valuations be increased above fifty percent of the true value of such real prop-
erty from year to year during such next ensuing period so long as the real property
is owned by an urban redevelopment corporation and used in accordance with an
authorized development plan.
Id.
The Missouri Constitution explicitly limits the ability of the state and its political
subdivisions to determine assessed property valuations. Article X, section 4(a) divides
property into three classifications, applying class I to real property. Mo. CONST. art. X,
§ 4(a). The constitution further divides class I property into three subclasses for assess-
ment purposes. Id. § 4(b). Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the assessed valua-
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entitled to tax exemption and abatement under Chapter 353, the corpo-
ration is not entitled to any specific period of exemption or abatement.
As long as the property is owned by the original redevelopment corpo-
ration and used in accordance with the development plan, tax assess-
ments may not exceed half of its assessed valuation during the tax
abatement period.72
A redevelopment corporation may sell or transfer the redevelopment
property and the legislative authority may grant these tax benefits to a
new owner, but only if the new owner agrees to comply with the provi-
sions of the development plan.73 If, however, the property is used for a
different purpose, or if the legislature refuses to grant tax benefits to the
purchaser or transferee, full taxes will be assessed. Consequently, the
property may be operated free from any Chapter 353 provisions.7 4
As a precondition to granting tax benefits, the legislative authority
must provide each political subdivision that may be affected by the tax
benefits with a written statement of the impact of the exemption on ad
valorem taxes and give notice of a public hearing on the development
plan.75 The written statement and notice must comply with local ordi-
tion for all real property may not exceed 33 1/3% of its true value. Id. The percentage
valuation also is limited by statute. The statute only permits assessment at 19% of the
true value for residential property and assessment at the rate of 32% for commercial
property. Mo. REv. STAT. § 137.115.5(1) & (3) (1986). The provisions of section
353.110.2 that provide for assessment based on only 50% of the property's true value
combined with the constitutional and statutory limitations on the percentage at which
valuation may be assessed effectively result in a maximum assessed valuation for com-
mercial property of 16%.
72. Id. § 353.110.2 (1986).
73. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.150.4 (1986). The section provides:
Any urban redevelopment corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of any or all
of the real property acquired by it for purposes of a redevelopment project. In the
event of the sale or other disposition of real property... and the purchaser of such
real property of such redevelopment corporation shall continue to use, operate and
maintain such real property in accordance with the provisions of any development
plan, the legislative authority of any city affected by the provisions of this chapter,
may grant the partial tax relief provided in section 353.110...
Id
74. Id.
75. Id. § 353.110.3(1). The section provides:
No tax abatement or exemption authorized by this section shall become effective
unless and until the governing body of the city: (1) Furnishes each political subdi-
vision whose boundaries for ad valorem taxation purposes include any portion of
the real property to be affected by such tax abatement or exemption with a written
statement of the impact on ad valorem such tax abatement or exemption will have
on such political subdivisions and written notice of the hearing...
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nance, and shall include an estimate of the amount of ad valorem tax
revenues of each taxing entity based on the estimated assessed valua-
tion of the property before and after redevelopment.76 All affected
political subdivisions shall have a right to be heard on the granting of
tax abatement and exemption."
As a second precondition to the granting of tax benefits, the legisla-
tive authority must enact an ordinance containing a sunset provision
that requires the expiration of development rights, including the pow-
ers of eminent domain and any tax benefits, if the redevelopment cor-
poration fails to acquire ownership of the property in the development
plan area within the period specified by the local government.78
To alleviate the effect that the tax benefits may have on the affected
political subdivisions, the city and redevelopment corporations that re-
ceive tax benefits may contract to have the corporation make "pay-
ments in lieu of taxes" (PILOTS).79 PILOTS are allocated among all
taxing authorities affected by the tax abatement on the same basis as
Id.
76. Id. § 353.110.3(1). The section provides:
The written statement and notice required by this subdivision shall be furnished as
provided by local ordinance before the hearing and shall include, but need not be
limited to, an estimate of the amount of ad valorem revenues of each political sub-
division which will be affected by the proposed tax abatement or exemption, based
on the estimated assessed valuation of the real property involved as such property
would exist before and after it is redeveloped.
Id.
77. Id. § 353.110.3(2). The section provides: "[A]Il political subdivisions described
in subdivision (1) of this subsection shall have the right to be heard on such grant of tax
abatement or exemption." Id. It does not appear, however, that the taxing entities can
challenge the decision to grant tax benefits of the level of tax benefits.
78. Id. § 353.110.3. The section provides:
No tax abatement or exemption authorized by this section shall become effective
unless and until the governing body of the city...
(3) Enacts an ordinance which provides for expiration of development rights, in-
cluding the rights of eminent domain and tax abatement, in the event of failure of
the urban redevelopment corporation to acquire ownership of property within the
area of the development plan. Such ordinance shall provide for a duration of time
within which such property must be acquired, and may allow for acquisition of
property under the plan in phases.
Id.
79. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.110.3(4)(1986). The section provides: "[P]ayments in
lieu of taxes may be imposed by contract between a city and an urban redevelopment
corporation which receives tax abatement or exemption on property pursuant to this
section." Id.
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their proportionate shares of ad valorem tax revenues."
Once the redevelopment corporation acquires real property and re-
ceives the statutory tax benefits, it will not be subject to the assessment
and payment of taxes based on full valuation of the real property until
after a period not to exceed twenty-five years or until it elects to pay
full taxes."1 At the earlier of the two periods, the corporation may use
the real property free from any of the conditions and restrictions of
Chapter 353 and the development plan.8 2
F. Rights of Third Parties
After the government approves a development plan, property owners
in the development plan area have no statutory or constitutional right
to participate in the redevelopment project.8 3 However, a city may
condition development plan approval on the redevelopment corpora-
tion's agreement to allow property owners to participate. After the
redevelopment corporation acquires property in the development plan
80. Id. § 353.110.3(4). The section provides:
The collector shall allocate all revenues received from such payments in lieu of
taxes among all taxing authorities whose property tax revenues are affected by the
exemption or abatement on the same pro rata basis and in the same manner as the
ad valorem property tax revenues received by each tax authority from such prop-
erty in the year such payments are due.
Id. If property owned by an urban redevelopment corporation is located within an
enterprise zone as defined under Mo. REv. STAT. § 135.200, that property is taxed
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 353. Id. § 135.215.
81. Id. § 353.110.2. The section provides:
After a period totaling not more than twenty-five years, such real property shall be
subject to assessment and payment of all ad valorem taxes, based on the full true
value of the real property; provided that after the completion of the redevelopment
project, as authorized by law or ordinance whenever any urban redevelopment cor-
poration shall elect to pay full taxes, or at the expiration of the period, such real
property shall be owned and operated free from any of the conditions, restrictions
or provisions of this chapter, and of any ordinance, rule or regulation adopted
pursuant thereto, any other law limiting the right of domestic and foreign insur-
ance companies to own and operate real estate to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
82. Id. The redevelopment property, however, may be subject to restrictions in the
form of real covenants that were imposed on the redevelopment corporation at the time
that the government approved the development plan.
83. Annbar Assocs. v. West Side Redevelopment Corp. 397 S.W.2d 635, 648 (Mo.
1965) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1966). But cf. GA. CODE. ANN. § 36-61-
9(c)(1987) (prohibits municipality or county from exercising eminent domain power
without first notifying landowner of planned use and providing landowner with oppor-
tunity to participate); Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of Atlanta, 338 S.E.2d 240




area, it may allow the previous owners, tenants, or others who wish to
occupy the property to pay an occupancy fee, but the occupancy is not
considered month to month, nor is the corporation required to give
notice of the termination of the occupancy.8 4 The corporation may
terminate the occupancy at the end of the period covered by the most
recent "rental" payment."
Section 353.130 provides that a redevelopment corporation may exer-
cise the power of eminent domain pursuant to Chapter 523,86 which
includes provisions for relocation expenses.8 7 Under these provisions,
a redevelopment project undertaken by a public agency must provide
relocation assistance to displaced persons when assistance would be re-
quired if federal funds were involved.88 The statute defines "public
agency" as the state of Missouri or any political subdivision or branch,
bureau or department of the state and "any quasi-public corporation
created or existing by law" which is authorized to acquire real property
and which acquires the property in whole or in part with federal
funds.89 The relationship between these statutes is unclear. The stat-
utes raise the possibility that a private redevelopment corporation
could be considered a quasi-public corporation within the meaning of
Section 523.200(2).9o If a court adopted this construction of the stat-
ute, an urban redevelopment corporation would be required to pay re-
84. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.140 (1986) provides:
[T]he urban redevelopment corporation may agree with the previous owners of
such property, or any tenants continuing to occupy or use it, or any other persons
who may occupy or use or seek to occupy or use such property, that such former
owner, tenant or other persons may occupy or use such property upon the payment
of a fixed sum of money for a definite term or upon the payment periodically of an
agreed sum of money. Such occupation or use shall not be construed as a tenancy
from month to month, nor require the giving of notice by the urban redevelopment
corporation for the termination of such occupation or use or the right to such
occupation or use, but immediately upon the expiration of the term for which pay-
ment has been made the urban redevelopment corporation shall be entitled to pos-
session of the real property ....
85. Id.
86. Id. § 353.130(3). See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
87. Id. § 523.205.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 523.200(2).
90. Id. The statute is also ambiguous in that section 353.130(3) could be interpreted
to mean either that section 523.200 must be followed if eminent domain under section
523 is used or that if eminent domain is used, the urban redevelopment corporation may
follow section 523.205 and the other provisions of section 523.
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location expenses under state law even though federal funds were not
involved.
In Young v. Harris,91 however, the Eighth Circuit considered the
relationship between a city and an urban redevelopment corporation to
determine whether federal relocation assistance requirements applied
to a redevelopment corporation. The court held that the corporation
was not an agent of the city as a result of the grant of the power of
eminent domain but, instead, a private entity to which the federal stat-
ute did not apply.92 Under this interpretation, a Missouri redevelop-
ment corporation organized under Chapter 353 is not required to
provide relocation assistance under either federal or state laws.
G. City Initiated Redevelopment
Cities also may acquire property by purchase or eminent domain in
an area designated on its master plan as a redevelopment area.9 3 A city
is defined by the statute as a constitutional charter city - a city which
has a population of 4,000 inhabitants or more according to the last
federal census and is located within a charter county or a city which
has a population of 2,500 or more and is not located within a charter
county.9 4 A city may clear this designated area and install, construct
91. 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979). The plaintiffs in Young brought a class action on
behalf of present and former low income residents of the redevelopment area known as
the Pershing-Waterman area. Id. at 872. The redevelopment plan financing for the
area consisted of entirely private capital with the exception of mortgage insurance from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Id. at 874. St. Louis, however,
used Community Development Block Grant funds to provide municipal services to the
area. Id. at 875. Plaintiffs argued that the redevelopment corporation and the city
participated in a joint undertaking and therefore the redevelopment corporation re-
ceived federal financial assistance through the city's receipt of the community block
grant funds. Id. at 877. Plaintiffs further argued that the receipt of this federal assist-
ance brought the redevelopment corporation within the ambit of the federal statute re-
quiring payment of relocation expenses to displaced persons. Id.
92. Id. at 877-78.
93. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.170(1) (1986): "Any city subject to this chapter shall
have power: (1) To acquire by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, or other-
wise, an area designated on a master plan under the authority of the legislative authority
of the city as a redevelopment area..."
94. lId § 353.020(3) (Supp. 1988). The section provides:
"City" or "such cities" shall mean constitutional charter cities; cities with a popu-
lation of four thousand or more according to the last preceding federal decennial
census and located in counties with a charter form of government; and cities with a
population of two thousand five hundred or more according to the last preceding




and reconstruct streets, utilities and other improvements necessary to
prepare the area for development.95 It also may sell or lease this prop-
erty to private corporations for redevelopment.96 These provisions al-
low the city to encourage redevelopment by initiating action itself.
H. Conclusion
Chapter 353 is a deceptively simple statute. Its essential purpose is
to promote urban redevelopment by private corporations. Urban rede-
velopment is promoted by delegating the power of eminent domain to
private corporations and by providing substantial tax benefits when
real property is acquired and used in accordance with an approved de-
velopment plan. The precondition to commencement of a Chapter 353
redevelopment project is a finding that the land in the proposed project
area is blighted. In the next part of the Article, the major criticisms of
Chapter 353 are examined.
PART II. CRITICISMS OF CHAPTER 353
A. General Criticisms of Urban Redevelopment
Urban redevelopment programs have never been free of controversy.
Despite the general desire to improve the quality of life in urban areas,
the focus of redevelopment programs has been less clear. One rationale
for urban redevelopment has been simply to improve urban areas in a
physical sense, making them more attractive places in which to live and
to visit.97 A second rationale for urban redevelopment has been to
eliminate slums and blighted areas that generally are characterized by
a high level of substandard housing.98 This rationale includes the as-
sumption that redevelopment would produce quality housing for the
Id.
95. Id. § 353.170(2) (1986). The section provides:
Any city subject to this chapter shall have power ... (2) To clear any such real
property and install, construct, and reconstruct streets, utilities and any and all
other city improvements necessary for the preparation of such area for use in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Id.
96. Id. § 353.170. The section provides: "Any city subject to this chapter shall
have power... (3) To sell or lease such real property for use in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter." Id.
97. See Marcuse, Housing Policy and City Planning: The Puzzling Split in the
United States, 1893-1931, in SHAPING AN URBAN WORLD (G. Cherry ed. 1980); Wil-
liamson, Community Development Block Grants, 14 URB. LAW 283, 284-85 (1982).
98. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55-21.1(a)(West 1967); Brown, Urban Redevelopment, 29
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urban poor to replace substandard housing.99 This model of urban re-
development is the blight driven model. Finally, legislators have
viewed urban redevelopment more broadly as a means to promote eco-
nomic development."°  The underlying thesis of this emphasis is that
the longterm vitality of urban areas depends on a solid economic base.
This model of urban redevelopment may be referred to as the economic
development model.
Urban redevelopment has taken place under two different statutory
regimes. The first regime, exemplified by Chapter 353, authorizes sub-
stantial tax benefits to encourage redevelopment and permits the gov-
ernment or the private redevelopment corporation to use the eminent
domain power to acquire land in the project area. 01 1 Under this re-
gime, the government does not provide direct subsidies to the redevel-
opment project; rather, it provides a hidden subsidy in the form of tax
benefits. The second statutory regime came into place as a result of the
availability of federal funds for slum clearance and urban renewal. 1o2
Under this regime, a government agency acquires land for redevelop-
ment, clears the land, provides adequate infrastructure, assembles the
land, and then sells or leases all or part of the land to private redevel-
opers. 10 3 The cost of the land is written down to make redevelopment
economically possible. Thus, the government provides a direct finan-
cial subsidy by underwriting the cost of initiating the redevelopment
project.
B. The Blight Driven Model of Chapter 353
Like urban redevelopment generally, Chapter 353 always has been
controversial, at least in the sense of generating litigation."o Similar to
B.U.L. REV. 318 (1949); Hill, Recent Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment Laws,
9 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 175 (1952).
99. Comment, Urban Redevelopment, 54 YALE L.J. 116, 118-20 (1944).
100. Comment, Urban Redevelopment, 9 U. Plrr. L. REV. 74, 77-78 (1947); C.
Woodbury & F. Cliffe, Industrial Location and Urban Redevelopment, in THE FUTURE
OF CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 652 (C. Woodbury ed. 1953); Brown, supra
note 98, at 319.
101. 1945 Mo. Laws 1242, 1247, 1249.
102. Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441
(1952)).
103. Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 301,
317-21 (1958).
104. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979); Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v.
City of St. Louis, 492 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civic
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its counterparts in other states, property owners affected by the stat-
ute's operation quickly challenged the constitutionality of the stat-
ute.1 °5 Relying on an earlier case involving the Land Clearance for
Redevelopment Authority law,10 6 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld
Chapter 353 against a variety of constitutional challenges.10 7
The recent criticisms of Chapter 353 have bypassed federal and state
constitutional law issues. Rather, the present criticisms may be
grouped into three basic categories: (1) whether local Chapter 353 pro-
grams are adequately managed, which includes ensuring developer
compliance with development plans;10 8 (2) whether residents in and
neighbors of the redevelopment project area are adequately protected
from the impact of project execution; 1° 9 and (3) whether the statute is
being used properly to eliminate blight.1 10 Without denegating the first
two issue areas, it may be said that they involve fine tuning the 353
program, while the third area involves a consideration of the very pur-
poses of the statute.
The successful applicant for a Chapter 353 project obtains substan-
tial benefits from the local government. Not only does the applicant
receive tax benefits that may be worth millions of dollars, the applicant
may be entitled to use the government's eminent domain power to as-
semble the development site. However, the project likely will displace
residents in the project area and may have deleterious effects on neigh-
Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 538 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. 1976)(en banc), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 941 (1976); Parking Systems, Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment
Corp., 518 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1974); Annbar Assocs. v. West Side Redevelopment Corp.,
397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1965)(en bane), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1966); Schweig v.
Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 676 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. Ct..App. 1984); State ex
rel. Devanssay v. McGuire, 622 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Maryland Plaza Re-
development Corp. v. Greenberg, 594 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Schweig v. City
of St. Louis, 569 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
105. Annbar Assocs. v. West Side Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo.
1965)(en banc), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1966).
106. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. of Kansas
City, 270 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1954)(en bane).
107. Annbar Assocs., 397 S.W.2d at 647-50.
108. Casterline, Tax Abatement Encourages Development, PRACTICING PLANNER
19, 46 (June 1977); Smith, Developers, Jackson County Wrangle Over Tax Break Cuts,
Kansas City Times, May 28, 1988, at B-8, col. 1; Kotula, Few Agree on Proper Tack to
Take in 353 Revisions, Kansas City Times, July 29, 1986, at D-31, col. 1.
109. Ochsner - Hare & Hare, Kansas City 353 Study 139-40 (March 1989)(unpub-
lished study).
110. Kotula, Officials Argue Over Redevelopment Law, Kansas City Times, Dec. 20,
1985, at C-1, col. 1.
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bors of the project area. As a result of these concerns, many Chapter
353 critics believe that a redevelopment corporation's prime directive
should be the elimination of blight. This emphasis is meant to ensure
that the redevelopment corporation provides benefits to the public that
offset the benefits it receives." 1
Chapter 353 does require as a condition of project approval that the
government specifically find that the area proposed for redevelopment
is blighted." l In the past several years, the Kansas City City Council
has come under severe criticism for approving Chapter 353 projects in
areas that allegedly lack the traditional characteristics of blight, 113 ex-
emplifying the economic development model. Several of these projects
have been in a mixed-use area of the city known as the Country Club
Plaza. With respect to two projects that the Kansas City City Council
approved for the Plaza area, a group of citizens brought a legal chal-
lenge to the government's project approvals. 14 Although the com-
plaint filed in the action raised a variety of issues, the central allegation
was that the city failed to present adequate evidence to support the
council's blight determinations. One of the two projects became so po-
litically volatile that the city ultimately approved the project only after
it was submitted for a public referendum.15
Blight elimination is at the crux of two other lawsuits that have been
filed in Kansas City. In the first lawsuit, a group of developers have
challenged the revocation of benefits by Jackson County, Missouri.
The developers allegedly were not eliminating blight in compliance
with the approved development plans for their projects and conse-
quently were no longer entitled to tax benefits as a matter of law." 6
The City of Kansas City intervened, alleging that it, and not the
county, is the proper body to determine whether a redevelopment cor-
poration is no longer entitled to tax benefits.
In the second lawsuit, Kansas City sued a redevelopment corpora-
111. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.030(11) (1986).
112. Id. § 353.020(l) & (2) (Supp. 1988).
113. Of Blight and Right: Concept of Missouri's 353 Law Shifts, Kansas City Star,
Dec. 29, 1985; Kotula, Officials Argue Over Redevelopment Law, Kansas City Times,
Dec. 20, 1985, at C-1, col. 1; Kotula, Few Agree on Proper Tack to Take in 353 Revi-
sions, Kansas City Times, July 29, 1986, at D-31, col. 1.
114. Achtenberg v. City of Kansas City, Mo., No. CV85-25593 Civ. M (Feb. 26,
1986).
115. Karash, March Start Scheduled for Sailors Project, Kansas City Times, Nov.
14, 1987, at B-2, col. 1.
116. Kansas City Terminal Dev. Co. v. Kelley, Civil Case No. CV88-12091.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/2
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
tion and its transferee for their alleged failure to remedy blight pursu-
ant to the approved development plan and contract. 117 This lawsuit
involves the Union Station, a Kansas City landmark. Union Station
and its preservation have become rallying points for those interested in
the city's revitalization as well as those who criticize the city's utiliza-
tion of Chapter 353.118
The controversy surrounding the use of Chapter 353 has generated
changes in Kansas City's redevelopment ordinance and in Chapter 353
itself. The statutory changes sought to improve protection of property
owners in project areas and to protect the various taxing authorities
that are affected when the local government grants tax benefits to the
redevelopment corporation. 1 9 Although the state law was not
amended with respect to the blight determination, changes in Kansas
City's redevelopment ordinance attempted to force redevelopers to pro-
vide facts that support the blight determination and authorized the
government to conduct an independent blight determination.
1 20
An editorial concerning the possible use of Chapter 353 in Liberty,
Missouri, best describes the dilemma that 353 presents. 2 1 The writer
explained that "[b]y such law (Chapter 353), almost anything any-
where could be determined blight. But that is what gives the law its
power, and simultaneously its potential for abuse." '122 The advocates
of the blight driven model of Chapter 353 might not have as much
reason to be concerned about the use of Chapter 353 if they believed
that economic development were a sufficient rationale for approving a
353 project. However, these critics doubt whether Chapter 353 bene-
fits are needed with respect to some projects that the government ap-
proves and whether other government projects are cost effective. 123
C. Criticisms of the Economic Development Model
The economic development model of Chapter 353 rests on the prem-
117. City of Kansas City v. Trizee Corp. Ltd., Civil Case No. CV88-24596.
118. Smith, Developers, Jackson County Wrangle Over Tax Break Cuts, Kansas City
Times, May 28, 1988, at B-8, col. 1; Kotula, Officials Argue Over Redevelopment Law,
Kansas City Times, Dec. 20, 1985, at C-1, col 1.
119. 1988 Mo. Laws 490-92 (codified at Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.110.3 (1986)).
120. KANSAS Crry, Mo. § 36.5.1 (1986).
121. Council Gets 353 Preview, New Antioch Publication, Dec. 11, 1985, at 1.
122. Id.
123. Everly, Tax Compromise on 353 Has Some Developers Cautious, Kansas City
Star, Feb. 5, 1989, at 13F.
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ise that the long range improvement of urban areas is dependent on
improving the economic base of the community. 124 Theoretically, pro-
moting economic development in the form of commercial and office
development has several benefits. First, it creates jobs that may benefit
the urban poor. Project construction creates jobs and there is a contin-
uing need for persons to provide services in and for the projects. Sec-
ond, by promoting white-collar jobs, the economic development project
may encourage middle and upper-income persons to reside in the cen-
tral urban area.1 25 These persons will have a financial stake in the
quality of life in the urban area and will support programs, taxes and
bonded indebtedness to improve the area in which they live. Finally, it
is argued that the development project will, in the long run, produce
tax revenues that could not have been realized without Chapter 353. 126
Critics of this model dispute the alleged benefits of economic devel-
opment. Specifically, they doubt that the benefits available under
Chapter 353 are necessary to encourage development in areas that are
not, in fact, blighted.' 2 7 In addition, critics question whether economic
development projects can provide enough economic benefits to the
community to offset twenty-five years of tax benefits. 128 Thus, the
most caustic criticism of Chapter 353 suggests that project approvals
that are not tied directly to the elimination of obvious cases of blight do
little more than benefit the redevelopment corporations and, indirectly,
their parent and sibling companies. 129
This Article does not seek to resolve the policy dispute surrounding
the use of Chapter 353. Several studies done in Kansas City and St.
Louis appear to support the manner in which those two cities have
124. Slayton, State & Local Incentives & Techniques for Urban Renewal, 25 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., 793, 795-96 (1960).
125. D. MANDELKER, G. FEDER & M. COLLINS, REVIVING CITIES WITH TAX
ABATEMENT 12 (1980) (hereinafter D. MANDELKER).
126. Casterline, supra note 108, at 23, 24; Roeseler, Current Planning & Zoning
Enabling Legislation for Cities & Counties in the State of Missouri, 21 UMKC L. REV.
221 (1956).
127. Everly, supra note 123, at 13F.
128. Slayton, supra note 124, at 796.
129. Casterline, supra note 108, at 24-25. Mo. REv. STAT. 353.030 (1 1)(1986) lim-
its the net earnings of the redevelopment corporation to 8% per annum. This 8% earn-
ings limitation is higher than the limitation in other state redevelopment statute and was
instituted in the hopes that the increased earnings along with the tax benefits and emi-




used Chapter 353.130 Rather, this Article examines in the next part
whether it was the intent of the Missouri legislature to make Chapter
353 a blight driven statute or whether economic development projects
are consistent with the original purposes of the statute.
PART III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CHAPTER 353
A. Introduction
This part of the Article examines the legislative history of Chapter
353 to determine whether its current use under the economic develop-
ment model conforms to the statute's original purposes or constitutes a
misuse of it. "Misuse" suggests that the statute is being utilized in an
improper way or in a manner that the legislature did not intend.131 To
reach a conclusion on this issue, one must examine the objectives of the
law. If the Missouri Legislature originally intended Chapter 353 to
clear physically deteriorated areas and upgrade the quality of life for
the urban poor, then the law has been misused in recent years. How-
ever, if the original goal of the law was to improve urban economic
conditions, as well as social conditions, then local legislatures have
used Chapter 353 properly in an effort to accomplish this purpose.13 2
The objectives of the legislation can be determined best by tracing its
history against a background of the evolution of urban redevelopment
in this country.
B. History of Urban Redevelopment
1. Federal Programs
Legislatures have enacted urban redevelopment statutes in response
to the physical decline of the central city and an increased awareness of
blighted areas and slums which resulted from the industrialization and
the urbanization of this country in the twentieth century.13 3 Although
slums always existed in cities due to rapid and unplanned growth, an
130. Ochsner - Hare & Hare, Kansas City 353 Study (March 1989) (unpublished
study); City Development Department, "353" URBAN REDEVELOPMENT CORPORA-
TION LAW IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI (Mar. 1985); D. MANDELKER, supra note 125.
131. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 717, 918 (J. Stein ed.
1986).
132. D. MANDELKER, supra note 125, at 11.
133. Comment, Urban Redevelopment and the Fiscal Crisis of the Central City, 21
ST. Louis U. L. J. 820 (1978); C. WOODBURY & F. CLIFFE, Industrial Location and
Urban Redevelopment in THE FUTURE OF CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 624-
25 (C. Woodbury ed. 1953).
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organized movement to resolve the problem did not begin until the
1940s.' 34 Before this, cities addressed the spread of blight with passive
tools such as zoning, subdivision regulation, housing, building and san-
itary codes, and demolition of unsafe and insanitary structures.
135
These methods were largely unsuccessful in stemming the growth of
blight. 136 While these methods did eliminate some substandard build-
ing in scattered localities, the laws did not further the goal of prevent-
ing blight.137 Consequently, legislators perceived that a more
comprehensive program was needed. 138 That perception gave rise to
the concept of urban redevelopment in the early 1940s.
Urban redevelopment has been described as "a plan for the redevel-
opment, for all types of uses, of areas suffering from blight or decay,
through a program of cooperation between government and private en-
terprise."' 1 39  Its roots evolved from the National Industry Recovery
Act of 1933,1" which marked the beginning of the federal public hous-
ing program operated by the Public Works Administration. The pur-
poses of this program were to eliminate slums and blight, provide low
income housing, increase employment, and fuel economic recovery
from the Great Depression. The federal government built and oper-
ated public housing with aid from local governments, and, by 1937, the
government had either contracted for or completed more than 21,000
dwelling units. 141
With the enactment of the United States Housing Act of 1937, the
federal housing strategy changed from building and operating public
housing to providing funds to local governments for these purposes. 
142
The 1937 Act created the United States Housing Authority and pro-
vided loans and grants-in-aid for low-cost housing to local public hous-
ing authorities in return for slum clearance. 143 Several early court
134. Brown, Urban Redevelopment, 29 B.U.L. REv. 318, 372 (1949).
135. Id. at 319.
136. Id. at 319-20.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 320.
139. Id. at 321.
140. B. MCKELVEY, THE EMERGENCE OF METROPOLITAN AMERICAN, 1915-1966
120 (1968).
141. Id. at 124.
142. 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (Supp. 1957)).
143. Comment, Conservation - A New Area for Urban Redevelopment, 21 U. CHI.
L. REv. 489, 492 (1954).
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decisions which struck down the federal government's use of eminent
domain for the purpose of slum clearance and public housing partially
prompted the decentralization of this redevelopment activity.
144
With World War II, the focus of the nation shifted to the war effort
and away from housing. 145 Nevertheless, a critical housing shortage in
many cities continued to exist.146 The shortage persevered because re-
development statutes were largely unsuccessful in luring private invest-
ment into the blighted areas of the city.147 Proposals to resolve this
failure included providing more federal funding for low income public
housing for those displaced by urban redevelopment activities and
larger scale, more centralized solutions.148 The federal government re-
sponded to these problems by enacting the Housing Act of 1949,1'9
which proposed to clear slums and provide a suitable living environ-
ment for every family. The 1949 Act primarily relied on private enter-
prise, but also authorized public agencies to acquire land through
eminent domain, clear it, and resell it to private developers, with the
federal government absorbing the difference between the cost to the
agency and the resale price.150 It further required local government
approval of the redevelopment plan and that the plan conform with the
general plan for the locality.'51 The Act also required a relocation plan
for displaced individuals.' 52
The 1954 amendment to the 1949 Act again signaled a shift in poli-
cies and philosophies. Prior to the 1954 amendment, the federal gov-
ernment provided financial assistance to local governments only when
urban renewal projects involved demolishing blighted structures and
constructing new housing.153 Thus, the 1949 Act emphasized the
144. United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935);
United States v. Certain Lands in Detroit, 12 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Mich. 1935).
145. B. MCKELVEY, supra note 140, at 120.
146. Id. at 124.
147. Brown, supra note 134, at 354. By 1949 twenty-four states had enacted urban
redevelopment statutes. Id. at 328.
148. Id. at 368.
149. 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1949)).
150. D. MANDELKER, supra note 125, at 2. See also D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGEN-
SMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 526-30 (2d
ed. 1986).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(a)(1949).
152. Id. § 1455(c).
153. D. LISTOKIN, THE DYNAMICS OF HOUSING REHABILITATION: MACRO AND
MICRO ANALYSIS (1973).
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physical structure of the community rather than a concern for its in-
habitants.154 By 1954, the federal government no longer considered
clearance of the land the only answer to urban deterioration; instead,
the amendment expanded activities under the 1949 Act to include con-
servation and rehabilitation. 155 Although the government shifted its
emphasis on how to accomplish urban redevelopment, the primary
purpose of the 1949 Act remained: to eliminate slums and provide bet-
ter housing.156 The 1949 Act required local governments to have a
building, planning and land use control program to qualify for federal
aid.157 The Act encouraged residential development. 158 This program
actually affected only negligible rehabilitation in the decade following
the program's expansion, and by the 1960s, critics characterized it as
actually making low-income housing more difficult to obtain and as
having racial overtones. 1
59
Although federal programs of the 1940s and 1950s focused on slum
clearance and housing, the 1960s witnessed a policy shift away from
wholesale clearance to conservation of existing buildings and neighbor-
hoods."6° The emphasis moved to gradual, small-scale and incremen-
tal reversal of the growth of blight to conserve existing areas 161 and to
redevelop commercial rather than residential areas.' 62 Courts held
that the condemnation and clearance of vacant lands for redevelop-
ment constituted a public purpose and, therefore, that urban redevelop-
ment statutes were constitutional.161 Congress enacted several laws in
the 1960s to attempt to rectify the deficiencies of earlier programs.' 6
154. Williamson, Community Development Block Grants, 14 URB. LAW 283-84
(1982).
155. D. LISTOKIN, supra note 153, at 8.
156. Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 301,
311-12.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c)(1949).
158. A maximum of 35% of the grants could be for non-residential projects. Id.
§ 1460(c).
159. D. LISTOKIN, supra note 153, at 8.
160. Johnstone, supra note 156, at 311-312. Many state legislatures amended their
statutes to include a neighborhood conservation element. Id. at 312 n.50.
161. NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION: A HANDBOOK OF METHODS AND TECH-
NIQUES 44 (R. McNutty & S. Kliment ed. 1976).
162. Comment, supra note 133, at 834-35 n.68.
163. People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (111.
1953); Parking Systems, Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1974).
164. D. LISTOKIN, supra note 153, at 8.
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These acts established grant-in-aid programs for community develop-
ment and required consideration of the social and economic needs of
the community as well as physical structures and housing needs. I65
The federal government attempted to consolidate its urban renewal
efforts in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,166
which established the Community Development Block Grant
("CDBG") program that granted an annual award to participating cit-
ies. The CDBG program gave local governments authority to adminis-
ter grants as well as a great deal of discretion regarding the use of the
funds. 16 7 The program again emphasized incremental, small-scale re-
newal activities and preservation of existing resources and neighbor-
hoods.' 6 ' The legislation was designed specifically to attract middle-
and upper-income people back to the municipal tax rolls.'69 Critics
charged, however, that CDBG grants were misued because the funds
were diverted to wealthier suburbs and used for improvements such as
tennis courts and swimming pools.' 70 Local communities distributed
the limited funds in response to local political pressure which pre-
vented lower income neighborhoods from receiving a sufficient amount
of federal assistance.17
In 1977, Congress amended the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974 and adopted as part of these amendments the Urban
Development Action Grant ("UDAG") program.'7 2 This was yet an-
other effort to attain the goal of providing every American with decent
shelter. The 1977 amendments targeted the perceived inadequacies of
the 1974 Act, with the UDAG program being specifically designed to
complement the CDBG program. 173 The UDAG program authorized
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to grant funds to
distressed cities and urban counties to "alleviate physical and economic
deterioration through reclamation of neighborhoods having excessive
housing abandonment or deterioration, and through community revi-
165. Williamson, supra note 154, at 285.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 5301-17 (Supp. IV 1974).
167. Id. § 5305(a)(l)-(13).
168. NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION, supra note 161, at 44.
169. Comment, supra note 133, at 823 n.9.
170. Greene, Urban Development Action Grants: Federal Carrots for Private Eco-
nomic Revitalization of Depressed Urban Areas, 3 URB. L. & PoL'Y 235, 236 (1980).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 236-37.
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talization in areas with population outmigration or a stagnating or de-
clining tax base." '17 4 Congress intended for these grants to stimulate
commercial, industrial and residential development with the goals of
improving the community's economic base and creating jobs."17 An-
other goal was to attract high levels of private investment that, absent
the federal grants, would not occur.
176
During the 1980's trend toward decentralization of programs and
decreased federal funding to cities, the most popular program for ur-
ban redevelopment has been tax increment financing (TIF). The TIF
scheme divides the ad valorem taxes levied on a redevelopment area
into two parts: (1) the tax levied on the base value of the property
prior to redevelopment, which is allocated to the appropriate taxing
jurisdictions; and (2) the tax levied on the increment in valuation
caused by redevelopment, which goes to the redevelopment authority.
The redevelopment authority then uses the money to retire the bonds
sold to finance the purchase and clearance of the project area.177 An_
other current program is the creation of enterprise zones under which
businesses located in designated economically deteriorated areas are
given incentives to provide jobs and job training to low-income resi-
dents within the zone. 178
Federal approaches to revitalizing the American city have under-
gone several shifts in emphasis. The original policy emphasized pro-
viding adequate housing for urban residents. The current trend has
shifted toward increased decentralization, increased local decision-
making and increased emphasis on economic development. The inten-
sified battle for the ever-decreasing federal dollar 179 has resulted in the
increased use of redevelopment statutes to achieve economic
redevelopment.
2. State Redevelopment Programs
At the state level, different perceptions of the source of the problem
of urban blight have resulted in different proposed solutions. 0 Indi-
174. Id. at 237 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5318(a) (Supp. 1 1977)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. D. MANDELKER, supra note 125, at 3.
178. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 150, at 552.
179. NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION, supra note 161, at 48.
180. Bauer, Redevelopment: A Misfit in the Fifties in THE FUTURE OF CITIES AND
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 9 (C. Woodbury ed. 1953).
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viduals concerned about the urban poor deplored the physical decline
of cities and pointed to "decay and blight" as causes of disease, juvenile
delinquency and crime.18 They called for the eradication of "life in-
imical [and] life-destructive environments."1" 2 They viewed the exist-
ence of unsafe and insanitary housing as the basic cause of most slum
conditions.1"' Planners and representatives of private interests be-
lieved these conditions could be solved by eliminating slums and re-
building those areas with adequate housing.184 This group viewed
redevelopment and rehousing as integral and interdependent parts of
the same program. 85 The major obstacles to achieving these goals
were land assembly and excessive costs of site acquisition and clear-
ance." 6 The solution necessarily involved massive federal funding. 87
Other analysts viewed the problem in economic terms, as a fiscal
crisis caused by the migration of the middle and upper income popula-
tion group and of commercial enterprises to the outlying areas of the
metropolitan area to take advantage of cheaper land prices. 8 A reac-
tion to the municipal debt crises common in the 1930s partially formed
the basis for this viewpoint. 189 These analysts believed that the erosion
of the city's tax base caused by this outward migration resulted in a
decline in the city's ability to provide public services and facilities." °
The migration also resulted in the costly extension of those services
and facilities to the outlying areas. 191 Substandard areas also usually
cost more to serve than they produced in tax revenue.1 92 Thus, by
focusing on problems caused by the migration, some analysts explicitly
distinguished urban redevelopment efforts from slum clearance and
low-income housing programs.
1 93
181. Brown, supra note 134, at 318.
182. Comment, Urban Redevelopment, 54 YALE L.J. 116, 117 (1944) (quoting
MUMFORD, CULTURE OF CrriEs 422 (1988)).
183. Hill, Recent Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment Laws, 9 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 173, 175 (1952).
184. Comment, supra note 182, at 118-19.
185. Id. at 139.
186. Brown, supra note 134, at 320; Johnstone, supra note 156, at 310 (1958).
187. Brown, supra note 134, at 368.
188. Comment, Urban Redevelopment, 9 U. PrrT. L. REv. 74, 77-78 (1947).
189. C. WOODBURY & F. CLIFFE, supra note 133, at 652.
190. See generally Johnstone, supra note 156.
191. Brown, supra note 134, at 319.
192. Id. at 318.
193. One author found support for differentiating between slum clearance legisla-
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Recognizing that the private sector could accomplish slum clearance
and housing programs if local government was provided with powers
and appropriate incentives, and in response to federal legislation, 94
New York became the first state to adopt urban redevelopment legisla-
tion.1 95 Because this statute was the first of its kind, it provided the
model for other states.' 96 Prior to enacting any legislation, New York
amended its constitution in 1938 by adding article XVIII which au-
thorized the legislature "to provide for low income housing or clear-
ance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of substandard and
insanitary areas, or for both such purposes."' 97 Section 2 of article
XVIII also authorized the legislature to delegate its eminent domain
powers to a corporation if the corporation's rents, profits, dividends
and distribution of property were regulated and if it was engaged in
providing housing facilities.' 98
In 1941, the New York legislature enacted the Urban Redevelop-
ment Corporations Act' 9 9 pursuant to article XVIII of its constitu-
tion.2 °° Its purpose was the "clearance, replanning, rehabilitation and
reconstruction" of areas where "substandard, outworn or outmoded
industrial, commercial or residential buildings prevail."' ' The statute
did not include among its purposes the provision of low income hous-
ing. An agency formed pursuant to the provisions of the statute would
supervise the redevelopment corporation. 202 The statute authorized
the delegation of the eminent domain power by a local government to
tion involving a housing element, and "genuine" redevelopment legislation in Zurn v.
City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18, 23 (1945), where the court distinguished
earlier slum clearance and housing statutes, and those enacted purely for redevelopment
purposes. Comment, supra note 143, at 492. In Missouri, for example, Mo. REV.
STAT. § 99.010-.231 (1986) which established a local housing authority was enacted in
1939 for the purpose of slum clearance, while 353 was enacted in 1943 for the purpose
of urban redevelopment. See also Marcuse, Housing Policy and City Planning: The
Puzzling Split in the United States, 1893-1931, in SHAPING AN URBAN WORLD 23 (G.
Cherry ed. 1980).
194. Hill, supra note 183, at 175.
195. Riesenfeld & Eastlund, Public Aid to Housing and Land Development, 34
MINN. L. REV. 610, 626 (1950).
196. Id. at 627.
197. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
198. Id. § 2.
199. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 1156.1-.24 (McKinney 1941).
200. Riesenfeld & Eastlund, supra note 195, at 626.
201. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 1156.2 (McKinney 1941).
202. Id. § 1156.11.
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the private corporation2 "3 only after the corporation had acquired fifty-
one percent of the property in the redevelopment area.2° 4 Although
not specifically provided for in the statute, the New York Constitution
forbade the delegation of the eminent domain power to a private corpo-
ration unless the it earnings were regulated and it was engaged in pro-
viding housing.20 5 Despite the statute's express purpose to eliminate
substandard areas, corporations could only utilize the statute's major
benefit, eminent domain power, if they provided housing. The statute
required the redevelopment corporation to provide replacement dwell-
ing accomodations to families residing in the proposed development
area either in the development area or elsewhere at substantially the
same rents.20 6
Because of the limitations in the 1941 Act and its failure to attract
capital for redevelopment, the New York legislature enacted the Rede-
velopment Companies Law in 1942.207 The 1942 Act liberalized and
effectively superseded its predecessor. 2 8 The legislature specifically
designed the 1942 Act to produce housing. The purposes of the statute
were for the "clearance, replanning and reconstruction, rehabilitation
and modernization" of substandard and insanitary housing conditions
and for "the provision of adequate, safe, sanitary and properly-planned
housing accomodations. ' ' 2 9 The legislature recognized that these sub-
standard conditions destroyed the economic value of large areas,
thereby threatening sources of public revenues.2 10 The statute also al-
lowed business, commercial, cultural or recreational uses of the prop-
erty in the redevelopment project when those uses were incidental to
the development's primary purpose of providing housing.21' In addi-
tion, insurance companies could organize as redevelopment corpora-
tions. 2 12 The statute did not provide for the delegation of eminent
domain power to the private corporation but instead required that the
municipality acquire the property in the redevelopment area and con-
203. Id. § 1156.16.
204. Id. §§ 1156.3 & .17.
205. N.Y. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 2.
206. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § l156.4(3)(g)(McKinney 1941).
207. N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 1157-1157.25 (McKinney 1942).
208. Comment, supra note 182, at 119 n.15.
209. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 1157.1 (McKinney 1942).
210. Id.
211. Id. §§ 1157.2(7) &.13.
212. Id. § 1157.24.
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vey it to the redevelopment company after payment to the municipality
of the costs and expenses incurred.213 The statute also limited earnings
of the corporation's stockholders to six percent per year.214
The primary benefits to the redevelopment corporation were land
assembly by the municipality on the corporation's behalf and tax abate-
ment for a period not to exceed twenty years.215 The New York Court
of Appeals upheld the 1942 Act against a constitutional challenge that
property condemnation under the statute was not for a public use and
that the statute was not confined to slum clearance and reconstruction
for slum dwellers.2 16 The court held that the New York Constitution
itself provided that the provision of low rent housing or the clearance
and rehabilitation of substandard areas were public purposes.2 17 The
court further held that the use of "or" in the constitutional provision
authorizing the legislature to enact legislation indicated that the legis-
lature was not required to confine that legislation to slum clearance.2" 8
It stated that the legislature could pass laws to accomplish either or
both purposes established in the constitutional amendment.219
Illinois also enacted an urban redevelopment statute in 1941, entitled
the Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Law.220 The purposes
of the statute were the elimination of "degenerative conditions, and the
rehabilitation of slum and blight areas."22' It defined "slum and blight
areas" as the "urban districts in which the major portion of the hous-
ing is detrimental to the health, safety, morality or welfare of the occu-
pants. ' 222 The legislature viewed these areas as ones that had become
213. Id. § 1157.19.
214. Id. § 1157.7.
215. Id. § 1157.25.
216. Murray v. La Guardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 771 (1944). Murray involved the construction of 8,800 apartments to house 24,000
people. Id. at 325, 52 N.E.2d at 885. The project called for the acquistion and clear-
ance of eighteen city blocks. Id. Stuyvesant Town Corporation was to construct the
project and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company funded the redevelopment project.
Id.
217. Id. at 329, 52 N.E.2d at 887.
218. Id. at 331, 52 N.E.2d at 889.
219. Id. The court further stated that property was limited to development only for
housing purposes when the eminent domain power was delegated to the redevelopment
corporation. Id. at 888.
220. 67-1/2 ILL. REV. STAT. 251-294 (Smith-Hurd 1959 & Supp. 1988).
221. Id. § 252(5) (Smith-Hurd 1959).
222. Id. § 253-11.
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unproductive and that failed to contribute their proper share of taxes
while concurrently consuming a disproportionate share of the public
revenue.223 Like the 1941 New York statute, the Illinois law empow-
ered the redevelopment corporation to exercise eminent domain
power,22 4 but only after the corporation had proved that it had ac
quired at least sixty percent or more of the land in the development
area.2 2 5 The redevelopment corporation also was subject to supervi-
sion by an appointed redevelopment commission.2 26 In addition, the
Illinois statute provided that no portion greater than ten percent of the
development project area could be used for purposes other than resi-
dential without prior approval of the commission.227 Although the
statute virtually limited development to residential purposes, it did not
limit the residential use to low income housing.22 8 The statute afforded
no tax exemption or abatement to the redevelopment corporation, but
it also did not restrict the corporation's earnings.22 9
Michigan also enacted an urban redevelopment statute in 1941, gen-
erally modeled after the 1941 New York law.23° By 1944, ten states
had enacted urban redevelopment statutes, and bills had been intro-
duced in Congress offering federal assistance on the condition of fed-
eral supervision.2 31 Missouri was among the first of those states to
adopt a redevelopment statute.2 32
C. Missouri's Redevelopment Statute
1. History of Chapter 353
In 1943 Missouri enacted the Urban Redevelopment Corporations
Act to encourage private participation in the redevelopment of St.
Louis.23 3 Prior to enacting the statute, the Missouri legislature had
223. Id. § 252(5).
224. Id. § 259(8).
225. Id. § 292(l)(c). Another option provides that owners of 60% or more of the
land area can agree to be bound by the development plan.
226. Id. § 256.
227. Id. § 267(3)(h).
228. Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 123, 59 N.E.2d 18, 23 (1945).
229. 67-1/2 ILL. REV. STAT. § 265 (Smith-Hurd 1959); Riesenfeld & Eastlund,
supra note 195, at 627 n.135.
230. Comment, supra note 182, at 119 n.15.
231. Id. at 119.
232. Id. at 119 n.15.
233. 1943 Mo. Laws 751-69.
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passed a Housing Authorities Law,234 which was designed to provide
"decent, safe and sanitary urban or rural dwellings, apartments or
other living accomodations for persons of very low and low income."
Furthermore, the legislature designed the housing statute to allow local
governments to receive federal funding for these projects pursuant to
the United States Housing Act of 1937.235
When the Missouri legislature enacted the Urban Redevelopment
Corporations Act, it closely modeled the statute in organization, form
and content after the 1941 New York redevelopment law.236 The stat-
ute did not provide for tax abatement but did authorize the creation of
private redevelopment corporations with the usual corporate powers.
In addition, those corporations were entitled to use eminent domain
power to facilitate land assembly.237 Because of the statute's applica-
bility to cities with a population of more than 700,000, it affected only
the city of St. Louis.23 8 The statute also required the redevelopment
corporation to provide assurance in its development plan that when-
ever dwelling units were destroyed as part of the redevelopment pro-
cess, similar accomodations at substantially similar rents would be
available to the occupants of the development area either in the devel-
opment area or in another suitable location.23 9 It provided for close
monitoring of the activities of the redevelopment corporation by an
appointed supervising agency. 24' Although the city could adopt gen-
eral standards for the approval of redevelopment plans, the statute em-
phasized that the standards must allow the corporations maximum
flexibility in their actions.2 4 1
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 353 in 1945, Missouri amended its
constitution to buttress the new redevelopment law. These amend-
ments authorized tax abatement for urban redevelopment projects
242
and established that the use of eminent domain for redevelopment was
234. 1939 Mo. Laws §§ 488-502 (codified as amended at Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 99.010-.231 (1986)).
235. Mo. REV. STAT. § 99.210 (1986).
236. 1943 Mo. Laws 751-69; 1911 N.Y. Laws § 892. For example, the purpose
sections of both statutes are identical.
237. 1943 Mo. Laws 759-60, 765-66.
238. Id. at 753-55 (applied only to cities of more than 700,000 population).
239. Id. at 757.
240. Id. at 756-58, 776.
241. Id. at 757.
242. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 7.
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a public purpose.2 43 The legislature modeled the eminent domain
amendment after a similar New York constitutional amendment
adopted in 1938.24
In 1945, the Missouri legislature totally redrafted the statute. The
redrafted statute combined the provisions of the two New York stat-
utes and included a tax abatement provision245 along with the ability of
the local government to delegate the power of eminent domain to the
redevelopment corporation.24 6 The amended statute contained neither
a housing component nor did it require supervision of the corporation
by an appointed agency. The law provided for taxation on the land
and no taxation of improvements in the project area for the first ten
years after the acquisition of real property by the redevelopment corpo-
ration, and for a fifty percent tax abatement on the land and on the
improvements for the following fifteen years. 24 7 Valuations on the ac-
quired real property were frozen at the level existing in the year prior
241to acquisition. 8 It included special provisions to encourage invest-
ment by life insurance companies, 249 and was extended to include Kan-
sas City.25 °  Additionally, limitations were placed on corporate
earnings. 25 ' Neither the 1945 statute nor the Missouri constitutional
provisions authorizing the legislation limited its use to providing hous-
ing, whether of a low income nature or otherwise.
Subsequent amendments to Chapter 353 were minor in nature, with
the exception of the continual expansion of the applicability of the stat-
ute to smaller cities. The current version of Chapter 353 applies to
charter cities, any city located in a charter county with a population of
243. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 21. Edward M. Stayton of Independence, Missouri,
allegedly introduced this amendment, which was for the purpose of giving cities the
definite authority to take affirmative action to solve the problem of blight. Records of
the constitutional convention of 1943-44 quote Stayton as saying that unlimited author-
ity to condemn was required for the reconstruction of cities.
244. N.Y. CONST. art XVIII, § I. Maryland has a similar provision which applies
only to the City of Baltimore. MD. CONST. art. XI-B, § 1. See also N.J. CONST. art.
VIII, § 3, para. 1.
245. 1945 Mo. Laws 1247-48.
246. Id. at 1249.
247. Id. at 1247-48.
248. Id.
249. Some experts suggest that a major impetus for the 1945 rewrite of the law was
the failure of St. Louis to get life insurance companies on the East Coast interested in
redevelopment activities in St. Louis. D. MANDELKER, supra note 125, at 17 n.7.
250. 1945 Mo. Laws 1243.
251. Id. at 1246.
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4,000 or more and any city not located within a charter county with a
population of 2,500 or more. 2
2. Purposes of Chapter 353
Many commentators, during the period when legislatures enacted
urban redevelopment statutes, perceived the problem of urban deterio-
ration in terms of a critical housing shortage.2 3 They equated blight
with slum housing, and saw the solution as clearance and redevelop-
ment of blighted areas accomplished by the construction of low income
housing. Early federal legislation was adopted with this goal in mind.
In addition, these same commentators believed that displacement of
the low income people residing within the redevelopment district with-
out a housing element made redevelopment unrealistic. 254 The re-en-
try of the World War II veterans into the housing market after a period
of inactive residential construction during the war compounded the
problem.255
Although the concern for providing housing prevailed when redevel-
opment statutes were first enacted, early court interpretations validated
their use for purposes other than slum clearance and the provision of
low income housing.256 While urbanologists and others deplored slum
housing, politicians tried to cope with municipal debts and recognized
the general lack of support for public housing.257 Public housing was
not a politically popular program.258 Additionally, a lack of profits
252. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 353.010, 353.020(3) (Supp. 1988).
253. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 156, at 308-09; Brown, supra note 134, at 369;
Comment, supra note 182, at 139.
254. Brown, supra note 134, at 369.
255. Johnstone, supra note 156, at 314.
256. See, eg., Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 123, 59 N.E.2d 18, 23 (1945);
Murray v. La Guardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 331, 52 N.E. 2d 884, 889 (1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 771 (1944).
257. Brown, supra note 134, at 354.
258. An example of an adverse political reaction to public housing occurred when
Fortune magazine in 1942 promoted studies on postwar problems with the object of
stimulating private investment in Syracuse, one of two demonstration cities. Several
proposals from the Syracuse council studying the problems caused fears of huge public
housing programs and prompted Mayor Thomas E. Kennedy to state unequivocally,
"As long as I am mayor, there will be no [more] public housing projects in Syracuse."
B. MCKELVEY, supra note 140, at 124-25. See also United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (subsidized housing located in one




made it difficult to attract private enterprise to the development of pub-
lic housing.2" 9 Because of these considerations, local legislatures may
have had difficulty supporting a program devoted exclusively to public
housing.
Similarities exist among the earliest statutes providing for urban re-
development. The Missouri statute provided for the redevelopment of
areas that had become "economic and social liabilities, and [that had
conditions] conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or
inability to pay reasonable taxes." 26° The Illinois statute also described
the conditions leading to slum and blight areas in terms of economic
deterioration and as areas conducive to "ill health, transmission of dis-
ease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, crime and poverty.
2 61
The New York statute used similar language in its statement of public
purposes and described these areas as economic and social liabilities.
2 62
All three statutes stated that age, obsolescense, inadequate or outmo-
ded design or physical deterioration caused these blighted condi-
tions.26 3 New York provided tax abatement to the redevelopment
corporation, 26 whereas the Illinois and the 1943 Missouri statutes did
not. When Missouri amended its law in 1945, it added a tax abatement
provision.2 65 The Illinois statute, the 1941 New York statute and the
1945 Missouri statute all allowed the delegation of the eminent domain
power to the private corporation, while corporations organized under
the New York and Illinois statutes were subject to supervision by pub-
lic agencies. As amended in 1945, the Missouri statute did not contain
similar restrictions on a redevelopment corporation. The 1942 New
York statute did not provide for the delegation of the eminent domain
power. In addition, both the New York and Missouri statutes specifi-
cally provided for residential, industrial and commercial development
in the redevelopment project.266
The primary distinction among the statutes is their textual commit-
ments to providing housing as a purpose of the statute. The Illinois
259. Johnstone, supra note 156, at 307; Brown, supra note 134, at 354.
260. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2) (Supp. 1988).
261. 67-1/2 ILL. REV. STAT. § 252 (Smith-Hurd 1959).
262. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 1156.2 (MeKinney 1941).
263. 67-1/2 ILL. REV. STAT. § 253-11 (Smith-Hurd 1959); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 353.020(2) (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 1156.2 (McKinney 1941).
264. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 1156.12 (McKinney 1941).
265. 1945 Mo. Laws 1247.
266. 1945 Mo. Laws 1244; N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 1156.3 (McKinney 1941).
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legislature definitely intended for development under the statute to be
for housing, as evidenced by the provision that limited development for
other purposes to only ten percent of the project area without approval
of the redevelopment commission.26 7 The statute did not require that
this housing be only low income housing and did not contain any rent
restrictions. 268 The commitment to housing under the New York stat-
ute is more subtle. Although New York did not limit its first statute to
providing housing, only corporations engaged in providing housing
could avail themselves of the main benefits of the statute because of
constitutional limitations. Furthermore, New York enacted new legis-
lation within one year and it limited the new statute to the develop-
ment of housing as its primary purpose, although not low-income
housing. At the time of the New York and Illinois enactments, the
federal government had designed its program to provide federal aid for
the construction of low income housing.269 Neither of these statutes
were designed exclusively to take advantage of this program.
27 °
Although these statutes enacted in the early 1940s sought to eliminate
slums and replace slum areas with new housing, this new housing was
not limited to low income housing.
27 1
The Missouri statute differs from the New York and Illinois statutes
in that neither the statute nor its constitutional counterpart specifically
limits the urban redevelopment corporation to providing housing; how-
ever, the similarity between its description of blight and its causes with
the New York and Illinois statutes indicates that the intention of the
legislature at the time of adoption was to attack housing problems.
The 1943 and 1945 Missouri legislation both contained this language.
Although the 1945 legislation deleted the only specific housing compo-
nent in the statute-the provision requiring replacement housing-that
fact, in and of itself, does not support an argument that the Missouri
statute differed from its counterparts in other states. The Missouri leg-
islature modeled the 1943 statute after the 1941 New York statute and
the 1945 Missouri statute was a combination of provisions from both
New York statutes, which were directed at housing.
The Missouri legislature originally adopted Chapter 353 in response
to the fiscal problems of St. Louis, which were caused, in part, by the
267. 67-1/2 ILL. REV. STAT. § 267(3)(h) (Smith-Hurd 1959).
268. Reisenfeld & Eastlund, supra note 195, at 627-28 n.135.
269. Id. at 621.
270. Id. at 626-27.
271. Johnstone, supra note 156, at 307.
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migration of middle-class families to the suburbs and a decrease in new
office construction in the city.2 72 However, the purpose behind the
1945 legislation was actually to solve the city's housing problem27
caused by the influx of people to the city in hopes of finding
employment.
274
Missouri previously enacted a public housing authorities act 2 75 to
allow corporations to take advantage of funds available under the Fed-
eral Housing Act of 1937. This, however, does not indicate that the
Missouri legislature did not consider the resolution of the housing
shortage as one of its primary purposes. The federal government rec-
ognized inadequacies in the 1937 Act and enacted the 1949 Housing
Act to resolve these problems. Chapter 353 may be Missouri's attempt
to attract development back to the city after the public housing author-
ities statute failed to accomplish that objective. Although the language
of Chapter 353 provides for commercial and industrial development in
addition to residential development, the statute falls within the main-
stream of other urban redevelopment statutes enacted during this pe-
riod which focused on the elimination of blight and slum conditions
and the provision of adequate housing.
Although the statute's main purpose may have been the develop-
ment of housing, the statute did refer to outmoded and obsolete condi-
tions that make the area an economic liability.2 76 This language and
the language providing for industrial and commercial development in-
dicate that the Missouri legislature authorized other kinds of develop-
ment. Regardless of the stated objective of redevelopment legislation
for slum clearance and for low-income housing, Chapter 353 has been
used extensively to attract industrial and commercial investment, and
occasionally to lure middle class taxpayers back to the city.2 7 7 Chapter
353 has been used less frequently to eradicate substandard housing and
to construct quality, low income housing in its place.
The original purposes of Chapter 353 and its current use may appear
to be inconsistent. Although the legislature was principally concerned
with the elimination of blighted urban areas and the construction of
quality housing for both low income and middle- to upper-income
272. D. MANDELKER, supra note 125, at 12.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 17 n.4.
275. Mo. Rzv. STAT. §§ 99.010-.231 (1986).
276. Id. § 353.020(2).
277. Comment, supra note 133, at 823.
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groups, Kansas City recently has used the statute to promote commer-
cial and office development. The underlying logic is that economic de-
velopment will improve urban economic and social problems and
provide a more long-term solution to urban deterioration than the
mere construction of housing. The change in emphasis in 353 projects
is really an evolution in thinking about urban redevelopment and not a
radical departure from the original purposes of Chapter 353.
D. Conclusion
The Missouri legislature enacted the Urban Redevelopment Corpo-
ration Law with "the obvious objective [of] involv[ing] private enter-
prise in the monumental task of eliminating urban blighted areas and
the inevitable social ills flowing therefrom."2 7 Providing low income
housing and promoting economic development are tools for that pur-
pose rather than separate purposes in themselves. Individuals who op-
pose a project may fail to consider that economic development is an
alternative method of eliminating blight. However, economic develop-
ment for that purpose alone in the absence of the elimination of blight
should not fall within the statute. Although certain scholars and
policymakers of the 1940s found the elimination of blight impossible
without the concomitant provision of low income housing,27 9 the Mis-
souri law did not restrict the statute to providing housing.
The current concern is that Chapter 353 may simply be a tool by
which private development, with the aid of tax exemptions and abate-
ments and the eminent domain power, benefits only itself without im-
proving social and economic conditions in urban areas. The underlying
theory behind Chapter 353 is that the provision of public benefits to
private development is appropriate only when private development
produces larger social benefits. Chapter 353 sought to ensure this quid
pro quo by permitting redevelopment only in areas that the government
determined to be blighted. In addition, legislators likely believed that a
statutory requirement of slum clearance and the elimination of blight
was necessary to satisfy the public use restrictions that the United
States and Missouri Constitutions place on the exercise of the eminent
278. Council Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Duffey, 439 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Mo.
1969)(en bane); see also Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 492 F. Supp. 402,
405 (E.D. Mo. 1980)(corporations formed pursuant to Chapter 353 were formed for
purpose of redeveloping blighted areas).
279. See supra note 254.
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domain power. The next part of the Article examines the public use
doctrine in detail.
PART IV. PUBLIC PURPOSE OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
A. Introduction
The fifth amendment of the Constitution provides that private prop-
erty cannot "be taken for public use, without just compensation."28
State constitutions also contain similar prohibitions against the taking
of property and also often provide that property cannot be "damaged"
without just compensation.28' These constitutional provisions limit the
federal and state government power to take property under eminent
domain power.282 The provisions impose two restrictions on state and
federal governments: 1) they can take property only for a public use;
and 2) when they do so, they must pay just compensation to the owner
of the property.283
The concept of "public use" for purposes of the fifth amendment has
evolved and expanded since the ratification of the amendment. Courts
originally interpreted the public use limitation in the fifth amendment
narrowly, and allowed the government to take property only for its
own use.284 To encourage economic development, courts expanded the
definition of public use in the early 1800's to allow private parties, such
as railroads and public utilities, to exercise the eminent domain
power.285 As a reaction to perceived abuses of the eminent domain
power by private parties, courts restricted the meaning of public use in
the post Civil War period and again began protecting private prop-
erty.286 During the periods in which courts viewed public use restric-
tively, they still upheld condemnation of property for such uses as
dormitories for university students, although the general public did not
have access to these facilities. Courts held that an educational institu-
280. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The restrictions on the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain in the fifth amendment also apply to the states because of incorporation
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
281. See Mo. CONST. art. I § 26.
282. Linhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. Rv.
546, 599 (1942).
283. Id. at 599.
284. Note, Public Use, Private Use and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 413 (1983).
285. Id. at 413.
286. Id.
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tion was "one in which all the inhabitants of the state [had] a common
interest.
287
From this beginning, two theories of public use developed.288 One
theory required "use by the public" while the other theory required
only "public advantage, convenience or benefit.",289 A court's defini-
tion of "public use" often depended on surrounding circumstances and
often varied with changing conceptions of the scope and function of
government. 2 °
When state and local legislatures began enacting urban renewal and
redevelopment statutes, courts expanded the definition of public use
and courts construed the phrase to allow for the benefit to "only accrue
to the people of a particular district and . . .not [to] the public at
large." '291 Relying on definitions of blight that were not confined to
slum clearance, 292 courts justified the expanded definition of public use
by theorizing that the elimination and rehabilitation of slums and
blighted areas provided an indirect benefit to the public. 293 After these
broad holdings, a municipality could condemn land and use it for in-
dustrial and economic development.294
When originally enacted, state legislatures designed urban renewal
statutes to eliminate slums and provide housing.295 States later enacted
more expansive statutes that allowed commercial and industrial devel-
opment in addition to residential development.296 State legislatures ex-
panded these statutes further to include the development of vacant
land.2 97 Originally courts upheld as a valid public use the acquisition
287. Russell v. Trustees of Purdue University, 201 Ind. 367, 382, 168 N.E. 529, 534
(1929).
288. Comment, Conservation- A New Area for Urban Redevelopment, 21 U. CHI.
L. REV. 489, 495 (1954).
289. Id. at 495.
290. Id. at 496.
291. Id.
292. Note, supra note 286, at 417.
293. Comment, supra note 290, at 496.
294. Note, supra note 286, at 417-18.
295. Comment, supra note 290, at 492. The author distinguished between urban
renewal and urban redevelopment statutes and reasoned that urban renewal statutes
provided for the elimination of slums and their replacement with low income housing
whereas urban redevelopment statutes "d[id] not necessarily involve low-cost housing."
Id. at 492-93 n.23.




of vacant land in outlying areas to build residential units for individu-
als displaced in the project area.298 Courts later upheld the condemna-
tion of vacant land to provide housing without the simultaneous
condemnation of a slum area.2 99 Courts then found that vacant land
which had "lain idle" could be condemned in order to facilitate land
assembly and encourage development of the area.3°
This part of the Article examines federal and state court decisions on
whether the condemnation of land, the subsequent transfer of that land
to private developers, and the delegation of eminent domain power to
those private developers constitutes a public purpose or use within the
meaning of both the Constitution and the respective state constitutions.
Although the condemnation process may fall within the meaning of
public use under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitu-
tion, states may construe their own constitutions more narrowly301 and
refuse to uphold an urban redevelopment statute.
B. Supreme Court Construction of Public Purpose
In 1954, the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker upheld the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 against a challenge that the
condemnation of land under the Act did not constitute a public use
within the meaning of the fifth amendment of the Constitution.30 2 The
plaintiffs owned a department store located in the project area and ar-
gued that their property could not be taken under the statute because it
was commercial and not residential. In addition, they argued that the
taking did not constitute a public use because a private, and not a pub-
lic, agency would manage the project.30 3 The Court first defined the
limits of the police power and found that the definition of its limits "for
each case must turn on its own facts. ' ' 3 1 It then addressed the role of
the judiciary in this process and stated:
The definition [of public interest] is essentially the product of leg-
islative determinations addressed to the purposes of government,
purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete
298. Id. at 493 n.26.
299. Id. (citing Cremer v. Peoria Hous. Auth. 399 Ill. 579, 78 N.E.2d 276 (1948)).
300. Id.
301. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d
713, 725 (N.J. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
302. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
303. Id. at 31.
304. Id. at 32.
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definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by
social legislation . . . . This principle admits of no exception
merely because the power of eminent domain is involved. The
role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being
exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.3" 5
After holding that the judiciary must defer to the legislature, the
Court then examined the purposes of the Act. It found that "[tihe
misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin
a river" and that the concept of public welfare was "broad and inclu-
sive.",31 6 In addition, the court found that the values included within
the public welfare are "spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled., 30 7 The Court held that once the legislature found that the
goal of having a beautiful and sanitary city constituted a public pur-
pose, the fifth amendment did not prohibit its taking property to
achieve those purposes.30 8 It stated that:
Once the object is within the authority of [the legislature], the
right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end
.... Once the object is within the authority of [the legislature],
the means by which it will be attained is also for [the legislature]
to determine. Here one of the means chosen is the use of private
enterprise for the redevelopment of the area. 0 9
In addition, the Court refused to find that public rather than private
ownership of the project was the only means to achieve these
purposes.310
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkff,311 the Supreme Court again
addressed the question of public use and the relationship between the
police power and the eminent domain power as applied to a state stat-
ute, although not in connection with an urban redevelopment statute.
Midkiff concerned a Hawaii statute that provided for the condemna-
305. Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added).




310. Id. at 34.
311. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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tion of a landlord's reversionary interest in a residential tract and for
the sale of that interest to the lessees of the tract.312 Qualified tenants
could accomplish this condemnation by applying to the Hawaii Hous-
ing Authority for a public hearing and determination of whether the
condemnation would "effectuate the public purposes" of the statute. 313
The legislators' purpose was to terminate the oligopoly that the legisla-
ture believed was "responsible for skewing the State's residential fee
simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility
and welfare.",314 Although the statute authorized the issuance of bonds
and appropriation of funds to acquire the leasehold estate, the tenants
who requested the condemnation provided the money to satisfy the
condemnation award.31 5
In upholding the Hawaii legislation, the Court relied extensively on
Berman v. Parker. It repeated that the" 'public use' requirement [was]
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers" 316 and that
the role of the courts in reviewing a legislative determination of public
use was "an extremely narrow one.",317 The Court held that legislation
withstood a constitutional challenge "where the exercise of the eminent
domain power rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."
Further, the Court found that the Hawaii regulation's purpose of re-
ducing "the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly
traceable to their monarch" was a "classic exercise of a State's police
powers. ,
318
In addition, the Court in Midkiff considered whether the transfer of
the property to private individuals made the use private instead of
public. The Court found that the transfer of the property to private
individuals did not alone make the use private. 319 The Court also held
that it was not necessary to have direct public enjoyment or participa-
tion in the use of the property.320 Because the statute advanced the
purposes of eliminating an oligopoly market in residential land, it con-
stituted a legitimate taking, even though it did not involve the actual
312. Id. at 233.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 232.
315. Id. at 234.
316. Id. at 240.
317. Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954)).
318. Id. at 241-42, 243.
319. Id. at 244.
320. Id.
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possession of the property by the state.32 1 Indeed, under the statute,
title was transferred directly from one private person to another. The
Court stated that "it is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechan-
ics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.
'"3 22
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that it should give a state
legislature's determination of public use the same deference accorded
acts of Congress. The Court reasoned that judicial deference was an
acknowledgment of the legislature's expertise and ability to assess the
propriety of using the eminent domain power to achieve the public pur-
poses that they sought to advance.323 It then found that state legisla-
tures were as capable of making those determinations as Congress.324
The Court held that when either the federal or a state legislature makes
that determination, courts must defer to the finding "that the taking
will serve a public use.",
325
C. Public Use Under State Urban Redevelopment Statutes
Early in the history of urban redevelopment, courts upheld state ur-
ban redevelopment statutes against constitutional attacks and deter-
mined that those statutes were not confined solely to providing low
rent housing for the urban poor. Two early classic cases upholding
urban redevelopment statutes against constitutional attacks are Murray
v. La Guardia326 and Zurn v. City of Chicago.327 These two decisions
formed the basis on which other courts relied to uphold their respective
state urban redevelopment statutes.
In Murray v. La Guardia,328 the New York Court of Appeals upheld
New York's Urban Redevelopment statute by relying on the state con-
stitutional provision authorizing the statute. 32 9 The court held that the
New York Constitution did not limit urban redevelopment to low rent
housing because it explicitly provided that the clearance and rehabilita-






326. 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944).
327. 389 Ill. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945).
328. 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944).




reasoned that the legislation effectuated an appropriate purpose of pro-
tecting the "financial stability of municipalities which suffer indirectly
from conditions existing in those blighted districts.",331 Secondly, the
court based its decision on the statutory provision that placed restric-
tions on the private corporation as a condition to its receipt of the stat-
utory benefits available.3 32 The court found that the benefit to the
private corporation did not render the statute unconstitutional when
the "public good [was] enhanced" by the elimination of slum and
blighted areas.333 In this case, the court upheld the statute based on
the achievement of the secondary purpose of protecting the community
from the "indirect" effects of blight.
In subsequent decisions, the New York Court of Appeals expanded
its definition of public purpose to include the development of vacant
land and development for economic purposes. 33 4 The court found that
an area need not be a slum for its redevelopment to constitute a public
use and that condemnation of property to construct industrial build-
ings constituted a public use.33 5 In another decision, the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed this holding and refused to restrict the con-
cept of public use to slum clearance. It held that "economic un-
derdevelopment and stagnation [were] also threats to the public
cognizable as a public purpose., 3 36 The court also found the acquiring
corporations self-serving motives irrelevant and that those motives did
not defeat the public purpose of eliminating substandard areas.337
Once the legislative body found the land to be substandard, the govern-
ment's taking accompanied a public purpose, and the use of a private
corporation as a vehicle for the elimination of the areas did not change
the "permissible nature of the taking.,
3 38
The Supreme Court of Illinois distinguished the decision in Murray
v. La Guardia when it ruled on the constitutionality of Illinois' Neigh-
borhood Redevelopment Corporation Law. In Zurn v. City of Chi-
331. Id. at 227, 52 N.E.2d at 889.
332. Id. at 326, 52 N.E.2d at 888.
333. Id. at 327, 52 N.E.2d at 889.
334. Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y. 478, 335 N.E.2d 327,
373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975); Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y. 210, 182 N.E.2d 395,
227 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1962).
335. Cannata, I1 N.Y. at 214, 182 N.E.2d at 397, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
336. Yonkers, 37 N.Y. at 483, 335 N.E.2d at 330, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
337. Id. at 484, 335 N.E.2d at 331, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 115.
338. Id.
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cago,3 39 the court held that the condemnation by a private corporation
of substandard and blighted property constituted a valid public use.
The court distinguished Murray v. La Guardia because the New York
Constitution provided for the delegation of the eminent domain power
to a private corporation only when it engaged in providing housing
facilities and was regulated as to rents, profits, dividends and disposi-
tion of the property. The Illinois statute did not impose such require-
ments on the redevelopment corporation."4  Although the Illinois
statute did not restrict the nature of the development, it did subject the
redevelopment corporation to public supervision and regulation.
3 4 1
In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished the redevelop-
ment statute from housing authority statutes. Unlike most housing au-
thority acts, the Illinois statute neither declared as one of its purposes
the regulation or control of rents nor conditioned the delegation of the
eminent domain power on the regulation and control of rents.3 4 2 The
court relied on the stated purposes in the Illinois statute that the "basis
for the public use [was] slum clearance and the rehabilitation of slum
and blight areas" and the legislative declaration that those areas were
injurious to the public health, safety, welfare and morals.3 43 The court
deferred to the legislative determination of public use and found that
once the legislature made that declaration, the courts could not over-
turn that finding. 3 " It held that "the taking of property for the pur-
pose of elimination, redevelopment and rebuilding of slum and blight
areas, [met] all the requirements of a public use and public purposes
within the principles of the law of eminent domain. ' 3 45 In addition,
the court held that the use of the property after the condemnation was
irrelevant and that public use did not require continued use because the
elimination of slums and blight satisfied the public purpose
requirement.3 4 6
The Murray v. La Guardia and the Zurn v. City of Chicago decisions
preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Berman v. Parker. Prior to
the Berman decision, courts, in determining the constitutionality of ur-
339. 389 Ill. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945).
340. Id. at 125, 59 N.E.2d at 23.
341. Id. at 118, 59 N.E.2d at 20.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 116-17, 59 N.E.2d at 20.
344. Id. at 128, 59 N.E.2d at 25.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 129, 59 N.E.2d at 25.
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ban redevelopment statutes, considered whether the state had adopted
a constitutional amendment that provided for the elimination of
blighted and substandard areas.3 47 But after the Berman decision,
courts relied on it, as well as other state court decisions, to uphold
urban redevelopment statutes.34 8 The South Carolina Supreme Court
specifically rejected the reasoning in Berman, however, because the
Supreme Court had not considered public use in South Carolina's "ac-
cepted constitutional sense." '34 9 The South Carolina Supreme Court
also refused to defer to the legislative determination of public use in its
redevelopment statute and held that it was a judicial rather than a leg-
islative determination.3 5 °
The courts in Murray v. La Guardia and Zurn v. City of Chicago
adopted broad definitions of public use and allowed that use to include
an indirect benefit to the public.351 In Foeller v. Housing Authority of
Portland,3 5 2 the Oregon Supreme Court refused to construe public use
within the meaning of the Oregon Constitution to include public bene-
fit. 353 The court stated that public use
means a more intimate relationship between the public and an
item of property which has been acquired under the power of emi-
nent domain than is denoted by such terms as "public benefit" and
"public utility." "Public use" demands that the public's use and
occupation of the property must be direct.3 54
The court further stated that a public body, not a private person, must
use and possess the property to satisfy the public use requirement in
347. See Adams v. Housing Auth. of Daytona Beach, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952)(en
banc); Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 891, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953). See
also Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837 (1958)(relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Berman and the state's specific constitutional provision to
uphold urban redevelopment statute).
348. Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash.2d 374, 385-90, 378 P.2d 464, 471-73
(1963). California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey and New York specifi-
cally adopted constitutional provisions providing for urban redevelopment programs.
Id. at 383, 378 P.2d at 470. See also Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142
A.2d 837 (1958).
349. Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 576, 91 S.E.2d 280, 285 (1956).
350. Id.
351. Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 128-29, 59 N.E.2d 18, 25 (1945); Murray
v. La Guardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 331, 52 N.E.2d 884, 887-88 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
771 (1944).
352. 198 Or. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953).
353. Id. at 231, 256 P.2d at 765.
354. Id. at 233, 256 P.2d at 766.
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the state's constitution.355
After the Foeller court defined public use narrowly, it then analyzed
precedents that involved urban redevelopment statutes and its own
statute. Under the Oregon statute, the housing authority condemned
the property and then conveyed it to a private party. The court found
that the resale of the property was not the primary purpose of the stat-
ute but instead served only an ancillary and incidental purpose to the
primary purpose of eradicating the causes of blight.356 The statute's
public purpose was "the clearance, replanning, and preparation for re-
building of these areas, and the prevention or the reduction of blight
and its causes., 35 7 Although the Foeller court was not bound by this
determination of legislative purpose, it afforded that determination
great deference. 35 1 In analyzing whether a housing authority's con-
demnation satisfied the public purpose requirement, the court first held
that the length of time the property remained in the hands of the hous-
ing authority did not determine whether the property was used for a
public or private purpose. Rather, the court focused on the use the
authority placed on the property.35 9 Second, the court reviewed all the
precedents on redevelopment statutes and concluded that those prece-
dents showed that "the purposes of redevelopment laws [were] (1) to
rid areas of conditions which propagate such evils as vice and disease,
and (2) to render impossible a return of the unwholesome condi-
tion.' ' 31 It then distinguished those state decisions that had held that
the elimination of blight was not a public purpose based on the provi-
sions of their local statutes and ordinances.361 The Foeller court rea-
soned that when an area
355. Id.
356. Id. at 239, 256 P.2d at 768.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 240, 256 P.2d at 769.
359. Id. at 241-42, 256 P.2d at 769.
360. Id. at 251-52, 256 P.2d at 774.
361. Id. The Florida and Georgia Supreme Courts had struck down their respec-
tive state urban redevelopment statutes in Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona
Beach, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952)(en banc) and Housing Authority of Atlanta v. John-
son, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953). Subsequently Georgia adopted a constitutional
amendment that provided for the elimination of blight. In Grubstein v. Urban Renewal
Agency of Tampa, 115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959), the Florida Supreme Court upheld a
statute that provided for slum clearance as a public use but specifically confined its
decision to slum clearance and stated that it was not applicable to blighted areas as
defined in the Urban Renewal Law. In Nations v. Downtown Development Authority
of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 324, 338 S.E.2d 240 (1985), the Georgia Supreme Court held that
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[loses] its old character as residential property and [struggles]
against obsolete planning to adapt itself to industrial purposes,
sinks into a substandard condition which subjects the city's health,
morals and safety to uncommon hazards, the acquisition of the
area by the public for the purpose of eradicating its evils and
thwarting recrudescence summons the property to public use.3
6 2
It then found that the housing authority's occupation of the property
during the demolition of the structures and the construction of the im-
provements sufficiently fulfilled Oregon's public purpose requirement,
because the elimination of blight actually occurs at this time.3 63 Fur-
thermore, the court found that the imposition of restrictions on the
property upon its resale to a private party to ensure that the blight
conditions would not recur also achieved the statutory purposes. 364
Courts also have interpreted public use for purposes of urban rede-
velopment to include the condemnation not only of vacant land but
also of the air space.3 65 In Jersey City Chapter of Property Owner's
Protective Association v. City Council of Jersey City, the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld condemnation of air space and found the decla-
ration of public purpose in the statute broad, inclusive and not limited
to "perceptually offensive slums."
3 66
The Michigan Supreme Court also took an expansive view of public
use in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.a67 It upheld
the state's Economic Development Corporations Act which sought to
provide "for the general health, safety, and welfare through alleviating
unemployment, providing economic assistance to industry, assisting
the rehabilitation of blighted areas, and fostering urban develop-
ment., 3 68 The statute authorized the city to acquire the property
through eminent domain and then to transfer the property to private
ownership. Detroit condemned property to convey it to General Mo-
tors Corporation and declared that its purpose was to "alleviate and
the state constitution authorized the use of eminent domain to acquire property and sell
it to private parties.
362. Foeller v. Housing Auth. of Portland, 198 Or. 205, 263, 256 P.2d 752, 775
(1953).
363. Id. at 253, 256 P.2d at 775.
364. Id. at 254, 256 P.2d at 775.
365. 55 N.J. 86, 259 A.2d 698 (1969).
366. Id. at 96, 259 A.2d at 704.
367. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
368. Id. at 630, 304 N.W.2d at 458.
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prevent conditions of unemployment and fiscal distress."3 69 The court
found that determining a public purpose was a legislative function. It
relied on the holding in Berman v. Parker that "when a legislature
speaks, the public interest has been declared in terms 'well-nigh conclu-
sive.' ,370 It then upheld Detroit's use of the eminent domain power
for the public purpose of alleviating unemployment and found any ben-
efit to General Motors "merely incidental."37'
The above cases demonstrate that courts now consider public use to
be a broad concept that encompasses even "indirect benefits" to the
public. Furthermore, most courts limit their review of the legislative
determination and consider it "well nigh conclusive.9
372
Courts uphold urban redevelopment statutes even when there is no
direct benefit to the public because the public receives an indirect bene-
fit from the elimination of slum and blighted areas.3 73 Courts reach
this conclusion without evaluating the extent of the indirect benefits,
even when the private corporation receives a great benefit. For exam-
ple, in Murray v. La Guardia, the private corporation acquired the
property from the city and redeveloped the blighted area. Conse-
quently, the corporation obtained tax benefits but the corporation had
no limit on its profits.374 The court recognized that the corporation
received these benefits, but it refused to find the statute unconstitu-
tional and instead held that the public good was "enhanced. 3 75 After
the Supreme Court's decision in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, a
legislature only needs to present a "conceivable public purpose" for the
legislation to survive a constitutional attack on these grounds.37 6 The
Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Poletown Neighborhood Council
v. City of Detroit demonstrates the extreme expansion of the concept of
public use. Public use in the context of urban redevelopment not only
includes the elimination of slum and blighted areas but also includes
purely economic legislation designed to improve the fiscal well-being of
369. Id. at 632, 304 N.W.2d at 458.
370. Id. at 633, 304 N.W.2d at 459 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36
(1954)).
371. Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
372. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
373. See, eg., Murray v. La Guardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944).
374. Id. at 330, 52 N.E.2d at 888.
375. Id.





D. The Public Use Doctrine in Missouri
The Missouri Constitution contains three provisions addressing the
exercise of the eminent domain power. Article I, section 26 provides
that "private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation. ' 378 Article I, section 28 provides that pri-
vate property shall not be taken for private use except for use as drains
and ditches and rights-of-way. 3 7 9 In 1945, the state adopted a third
constitutional provision, article VI, section 21, which authorizes local
governments to take or to permit a taking by eminent domain for the
purposes of reclamation and redevelopment of blighted, substandard
and insanitary areas.380
The Missouri Supreme Court first construed a statute enacted pursu-
ant to article VI, section 21 and analyzed that constitutional provision
in relation to the other constitutional provisions on eminent domain in
State on inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of
Kansas City, Missouri,381 which involved Missouri's Land Clearance
for Redevelopment Authority Law.3 82 In Dalton, the plaintiff argued
that the city's transfer of property to private interests after acquiring it
through its eminent domain power constituted a taking for private use
and, therefore, violated the prohibition in article I, section 28 that pri-
vate property cannot be taken for private use except in specific situa-
tions.383 In addition to the expressed exceptions that allow a taking for
private use, article I, section 28 further provides that the judiciary
should decide whether the contemplated use is a public use without
following any legislative declaration that the use is public. 384 The
plaintiff argued that article VI, section 21 was not an additional excep-
tion to the prohibition in article I, section 28 against taking private
property for private use.385 The Court held that the failure of article
377. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 630, 304
N.W.2d 455, 458 (1981).
378. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26.
379. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 28.
380. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
381. 270 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1954)(en bane).
382. Mo. Rv. STAT. §§ 99.300-.660 (1986).
383. 270 S.W.2d at 51.
384. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 28.
385. Dalton, 270 S.W.2d at 51.
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VI, section 21 to address uses for the property after clearance of the
blight conditions "convey[ed]... the definite assumption that the pri-
mary object and public purpose of the law [was] the clearance and cor-
rection of any duly declared blighted and insanitary condition, and that
thereafter the area may be sold with or without restrictions.,
386
The Dalton court next considered whether article VI, section 21 was
an exception to the provision of article I, section 28 that the question of
what constituted a public use was solely for the judiciary regardless of
any legislative finding. The court stated that article VI, section 21 "un-
qualifiedly authorize[d] the legislature and cities and counties operat-
ing under constitutional charter to enact legislation providing for the
taking of blighted and insanitary areas by eminent domain., 387 The
court reconciled these apparently conflicting constitutional provisions
by holding that:
final determination of the question whether the contemplated use
of any property sought to be taken under the Law here in question
is public rests upon the courts, but ... a legislative finding under
said law that a blighted or insanitary area exists and that the legis-
lative agency proposes to take the property therein under the
processes of eminent domain for the purpose of clearance and im-
provement and subsequent sale upon such terms and restrictions
as it may deem in the public interest will be accepted by the courts
as conclusive evidence that the contemplated use thereof is public,
unless it further appears upon allegation and clear proof that the
legislative finding was arbitrary or was induced by fraud, collusion
or bad faith.388
This decision constitutionally validated the use of the eminent do-
main power to clear and replan slum and blighted areas. Despite the
absence of a specific constitutional provision stating that the elimina-
tion of certain areas, in and of itself, is a public use or purpose, the
Dalton court gave local legislatures the power to make that
determination.
In Dalton, the court construed the Land Clearance for Redevelop-
ment Authority Law, and not the Urban Redevelopment Corporations
Law. The court extensively discussed the meaning of public use and
purpose under Missouri law. It described the concept of public use as
broad and expansive and "synonymous with 'public advantage'-'pub-
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 52.
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lie benefit.' ,,389 Furthermore, it found public use to be an evolving
concept that should "be applied and construed as made necessary to
the public welfare by changing conditions.
'" 390
Examining the statute at issue, the court held that despite the city's
subsequent transfer of the property to private ownership, the taking
could still constitute a public use.39 1 It applied the same reasoning as
courts in other jurisdictions that upheld urban renewal statutes: that
the elimination of blight occurs during the redevelopment stage and
prior to the transfer of the property to private ownership and that the
city may transfer the property with restrictions to further the goals of
eliminating blight. 392  As in other jurisdictions, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that any benefit to private parties was only ancillary or inci-
dental to the primary purpose of the statute.3 93 The court stated that
"[n]othing in the Constitution or statutes requires that public owner-
ship be continued for a longer time than is necessary to the accomplish-
ment of the public purposes which give rise to the taking.
'394
The Missouri Supreme Court again considered the relationship be-
tween article VI, section 21 and article I, section 28 of the Missouri
Constitution in Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp., as
those provisions applied to the Urban Redevelopment Corporations
Law.395 The court quoted extensively from Dalton and held that the
elimination of blight under the urban redevelopment statute was a pub-
lic use under the federal and state constitutions.396 It recognized that
article I, section 28 required the courts to determine "whether the con-
templated use of any property sought to be taken... [was] public";
3 9 7
however, it found that a legislative determination that an area was in-
sanitary and blighted and that the eminent domain power should be
used to clear and improve the area would be conclusive evidence that
389. Id. at 50.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 51.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 51, 53.
394. Id. at 51.
395. 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1965)(en bane), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1966).
396. Id. at 643-47; see also Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. of St. Louis v.
City of St. Louis, 270 S.W.2d 58, 64 (Mo. 1954); Schweig v. Maryland Plaza Redevelop-
ment Corp., 676 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
397. Annbar, 397 S.W.2d at 646 (quoting State on Inf of Dalton v. Land Clearance
for Redevelopment Auth. of Kansas City, Mo., 270 S.W.2d 44, 52 (Mo. 1954)(en
banc)).
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the use is public absent an arbitrary and capricious finding, collusion,
fraud or bad faith.3 98 The court further adopted the holding from Dal-
ton that "the purpose in acquiring the land is to rid it of its blighted
and insanitary condition and... [that the] primary purpose of a rede-
velopment project is a public purpose [with] any benefits to private indi-
viduals [being] merely incidental to the public purpose."'39 9
In addition to the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority
Law4° ° and Chapter 353, Missouri's Planned Industrial Expansion
Act also provides for the condemnation of blighted, insanitary or un-
derdeveloped industrial areas for the purposes of redevelopment.4"
The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the validity of this legislation in
State ex rel. Atkinson v. Planned Industrial Expansion Authority. 4 2
More recently, in Tierney v. Planned Industrial Expansion Author-
ity,4"3 the Missouri Supreme Court indicated the great extent to which
it will go to uphold a government's blight determination and a statute's
public purpose. The Planned Industrial Expansion Authority of Kan-
sas City originally had not included the plaintiffs' property in the desig-
nated blighted area but subsequently added the property to a proposed
industrial development.' The plaintiffs alleged their property was not
blighted and the taking of property thought to be economically un-
derutilized did not constitute a public use. They argued that there was
a higher and better use for all property and "that the concept of eco-
nomic underutilization [was] so broad as to confer upon the legislative
authority... the unlimited discretion to take one person's property for
the benefit of another"" °5 in violation of article I, section 28 of the
Missouri Constitution. The court, however, rejected this argument and
stated that the concept of urban redevelopment included more than
slum clearance. It found economic underutilization to be a valid con-
cept upon which to base redevelopment and held that industrial devel-
opment constituted a public purpose." 6 Furthermore, the court found
that the city council had sufficient evidence to support its finding that
398. Id. (quoting Dalton, 270 S.W.2d at 52).
399. Id. (quoting Dalton, 270 S.W.2d at 53)(emphasis in original).
400. Mo. Rv. STAT. §§ 99.300 -.660 (1951).
401. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 100.300 -.620 (1986).
402. 517 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1975)(en banc).
403. 742 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1987)(en bane).
404. Id. at 149.




"redevelopment of [the] area could promote a higher level of economic
activity, increased employment and greater services to the public." 7
Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not met their burden
of showing that the blight determination was arbitrary or an "unrea-
sonable abuse of legislative authority.""' 8 With the Tierney decision,
the Missouri Supreme Court extended the concept of public use to in-
clude the economic well-being of the city, to the same extent as did the
Michigan Supreme Court in Poletown.
E. Exercise of Eminent Domain Power
Another major legal issue litigated in connection with urban redevel-
opment statutes is the delegation of the eminent domain power to a
private redevelopment corporation. This section discusses the delega-
tion of the eminent domain power to private corporations in general
and its application under Missouri law in connection with urban rede-
velopment projects.
1. Overview of Delegation of the Eminent Domain Power
Since early in American history, certain private corporations or indi-
viduals needed to exercise the eminent domain power. The delegation
of this power, however, was circumscribed carefully and generally lim-
ited to public service companies and railroads.' Corporations could
exercise the eminent domain power only in those instances where it
was "organized under the authority of the state to serve the public at
reasonable rates and without discrimination, and [to] provide a neces-
sity or a convenience that [could] be provided only if the power of
eminent domain is available."41 When the power is delegated to a
private party, that party may exercise the power only on its own behalf
and not on behalf of others.4" The delegation of the power has been
upheld even when the private party that condemns the property does
so for its own benefit, not to provide a public service, but only when the
legislature has declared that the condemnation constitutes a public
purpose and there exists a constitutional provision to that effect.4 2
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 150, at § 20.8.
410. Id.
411. IA J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.21[2] at 3-55 (rev. 3d
ed. 1986) [hereinafter NICHOLS].
412. Flora Logging Co. v. Boeing, 43 F.2d 145 (D. Or. 1930) (condemnation by
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States also have delegated the eminent domain power to non-profit or-
ganizations such as hospitals and universities.4 13 The traditional areas
in which states have allowed the exercise of eminent domain by private
enterprises414 are for irrigation, 15 drainage,416 reclamation of wet-
lands,4 17 mills and milldams,418 clearing of doubtful title,'4 19 mines,
4 20
lumbering42 ' and private roads.422
2. Delegation of the Eminent Domain Power Under Missouri Law
Article VI, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution expressly autho-
rizes constitutional charter cities and counties to enact ordinances for
clearance of blighted and insanitary areas.423 The statute authorizes
local governments to enact ordinances "for taking or permitting the
taking, by eminent domain of property" for the purposes spelled out in
the provision.424 This constitutional provision purportedly constitutes
the authority under which the Missouri legislature enacted Chapter
353 permitting the delegation of the eminent domain power to private
redevelopment corporations.425
The Missouri Supreme Court addressed the delegation of the emi-
nent domain power in Board of Regents for Northeast Missouri State
Teachers College v. Palmer,42 6 where property owners challenged the
delegation of the power to the Northeast Missouri State Teachers Col-
lege to build a dormitory.427 The General Assembly had delegated the
logging company for private logging railroad upheld when recognized that means of
transportation of raw products is in interest of public welfare).
413. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 150, at § 20.8.
414. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 411, 7.62, 7.63.
415. Id. § 7.64.
416. Id. § 7.65 - 7.67.
417. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 150, at § 20.8.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 411, § 7.71.
421. Id. § 7.72.
422. Id. § 7.73.
423. Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 21.
424. Id. (emphasis added). Article VI, § 19 empowers cities with a population of
more than 5,000 inhabitants to adopt a charter form of government and article VI, § 18
gives this same power to counties with a population of more than 85,000.
425. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 353.120, .130, .170 (1986).
426. 204 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1947).
427. Id. at 294.
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eminent domain power to state educational institutions for similar
projects.42 The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the delegation
against an argument that only the state, a county or a city could exer-
cise eminent domain under article I, section 27 of the Missouri Consti-
tution.42 9 The court held that both the exercise of the eminent domain
power and the power to delegate its exercise were legislative functions
and that the cited constitutional provision only addressed restrictions
on the condemnation of excess property and not the entity that may
exercise eminent domain.4 30 In addition, the court upheld the right of
the legislative branch to delegate that power to a government agency,
such as an educational institution.
4 3 1
In Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp., the Missouri
Supreme Court upheld Chapter 353 against an argument that the law
was unconstitutional because it permitted the eminent domain power
to be delegated to private corporations for redevelopment purposes.43 2
The court began with the assumption that the authority exists to confer
the power on a private corporation if it exists to confer the power on a
public agency. The court first looked to article VI, section 21 of the
Missouri Constitution which provides "for the taking or permitting the
taking, by eminent domain," to eliminate blighted and insanitary areas.
The Annbar court found that although section 21 empowered legisla-
tive bodies to provide for the use of the eminent domain power to ac-
quire property to eliminate blight and insanitary conditions, it did not
designate or make a "distinction between entities.... [that] legislative
bodies may invest with that power."4 3 The court found that the con-
stitution did not prohibit investing a private corporation with the emi-
nent domain power and refused to question the legislature's
determination on what entities should have that power.4 34 Further-
more, it found no distinction "between the power granted redevelop-
ment corporations and that granted railroads and others to carry on a
business necessary to serve the public.,
435
428. Id.
429. Id. at 293.
430. Id. at 294.
431. Id.
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To reach the conclusion that the legislature could invest private enti-
ties with the eminent domain power, the court relied on Berman v.
Parker. In Berman, the Court held that the eminent domain power
was the means to accomplish the goal of eliminating blight and that
public ownership of redevelopment property was not the sole means of
accomplishing this end.43 6 The Missouri court did not acknowledge
the distinction between Missouri's urban redevelopment statute and
the statute at issue in Berman, which provided that the public author-
ity first acquire ownership of the property and then transfer it to the
private corporation. Instead, the Missouri court held that it could not
say "that public bodies are the only entities that may be invested with
the power of eminent domain-the authority to designate those entities
with whom it may invest that power is solely that of the legislative
branch."'4 37 The court also relied on the holdings of other jurisdictions
where courts upheld statutes that provided for the delegation of the
eminent domain power against constitutional attacks. 438 These stat-
utes, however, can be distinguished from the Missouri statute because
the cases involved supervised housing or redevelopment authorities un-
like Missouri's private redevelopment corporations.
F. Conclusion
The Missouri Supreme Court and other state supreme courts consist-
ently uphold urban renewal and urban redevelopment statutes by find-
ing that the elimination of blight and substandard areas satisfies the
public use requirement of the takings clauses of both the federal and
respective state constitutions. Furthermore, these courts hold that any
benefit to those private corporations that obtain title in the condemned
property is only incidental or ancillary to the purpose of eliminating
blight. They also find that restrictions either in deeds that convey the
property from the public authority or in contracts between the city and
the redevelopment corporation further the declared statutory purposes.
Courts hold that these restrictions on the use of the property prevent
the recurrence of blight conditions. Even in those states that require a
close nexus between the use to which the property is put after the con-
demnation and the public use, courts uphold urban redevelopment
statutes by reasoning that the public purpose is achieved when the
436. Id. (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
437. Id. (emphasis added).
438. Id. at 647-48.
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blight is eliminated and that the public occupation of the land required
by the state constitutions occurs during the clearance period.
Courts accord great deference to the legislative determination of
public use and purpose even when the question under that state's law is
a judicial rather than a legislative one. By interpreting public use
broadly and by deferring to the legislature, the courts have enabled
private parties to utilize urban redevelopment statutes to accomplish
purely economic development projects instead of limiting the statutes
to the elimination of blight. Still, the courts recognize that a blight
determination is a threshold requirement under most urban redevelop-
ment statutes. Thus, the extent to which courts interfere with legisla-
tive decision-making regarding urban redevelopment statutes depends
upon the courts' views of the concept of blight and of their role in
supervising the legislative branch.
PART V. BLIGHT: THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT
A. Overview of Blight
The impetus for an urban redevelopment program is a legislative de-
termination that an area is blighted. Chapter 353 defines blighted areas
as areas that "by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded
design or physical deterioration, have become economic and social lia-
bilities, and that such conditions are conducive to ill health, transmis-
sion of disease, crime or inability to pay reasonable taxes. ' 439 An
"area," for purposes of the statute, is defined as one that is found "to be
blighted."'  In addition, the definition of "area" provides for the in-
clusion of buildings and improvements and any real property whether
or not improved, if the inclusion of that property is found by the legis-
lature to be necessary to effectuate the redevelopment program."' The
statute defines blight with a cause and effect relationship. Certain con-
ditions in the blighted area, i.e. "age, obsolescence, inadequate or out-
moded design or physical deterioration," have caused the area to
become an "economic and social liability" to the municipality." 2
When legislatures enacted the original urban redevelopment statutes,
they viewed blight primarily as areas with deteriorating structures.
443
439. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2) (Supp. 1988).
440. Id. § 353.020(l).
441. Id.
442. Id. (emphasis added).
443. Brown, Urban Redevelopment, 29 B.U.L. REV. 318 (1949).
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The housing shortage that necessitated living in these areas led to over-
crowding, crime and disease. 4 At this time, legislatures viewed blight
as an undesirable object and concentrated the statutes on the age of
structures and structural deficiencies as well as environmental condi-
tions such as overcrowding, crime and disease. Legislators drafted
blight provisions in cause and effect language. In addition, legislatures
considered blight as a condition that would spread throughout the
community if not arrested." 5
Gradually, this perception of blight changed to the view that blight
was a process through which neighborhoods became "deteriorated or
functionaly obsolete."" 6 Neighborhoods constructed at the turn of
the century no longer adequately provided for the needs of modern life
because of their outmoded planning and street conditions which could
not handle automobile traffic." 7 These factors led to a migration of
inner city residents to suburban areas specifically designed for this new
lifestyle." This exodus led to the further deterioration of many urban
areas and, by the 1960s, to an urban population "increasingly domi-
nated by non-upwardly mobile households."' 9 As a result, "undesir-
able environmental conditions, such as high rates of crime, vandalism,
drug addiction, family breakdown, and ill health" intensified.4 5 Ur-
ban redevelopment statutes appear to recognize that blight is not only a
static condition defined in terms of substandard structures, but it also is
a process of economic and social deterioration. Implicitly, the statutes
then authorized programs that attack the symptoms of the process of
deterioration as well as the process itself.
Each state statute defines blight in a different manner, with some
providing detailed definitions of the conditions that will be considered
blight. For example, the Missouri statute defines blighted areas in
broad terms of "age, obsolescence, inadequate design or physical dete-
rioration." '45 1 In comparison, the New Jersey statute contains five sep-
arate definitions of blight, including conditions such as remoteness
444. Id.
445. Foeller v. Housing Auth., 198 Or. 205, 256 P.2d (1953).
446. Downs, Key Relationships Between Urban Development and Neighborhood
Change, J. AM. PLAN. A. 462, 463 (1979).
447. Id. at 463.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 465-66.
450. Id. at 466.
451. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.020(2) (Supp. 1988).
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from developed areas, discontinuance of use of manufacturing and in-
dustrial buildings, total lack of utilization of an area because of condi-
tions of title and diverse ownership and areas blighted because of
deleterious land use or obsolete layout.4 5  Legislatures originally
designed urban redevelopment statutes to promote housing develop-
ment. Now the emphasis has shifted from providing decent housing for
the urban poor to increasing economic development within urban ar-
eas. Even with this shift in emphasis, a blight determination is a pre-
requisite to using urban redevelopment statutes to promote economic
development. This part of the Article examines the factors used in de-
termining blight and judicial construction of those statutory provisions.
It also examines the scope of review that the Missouri courts apply to a
municipality's finding that an area is blighted.
B. Blight in the Courts
Not every statutory condition of blight has to be met before a court
will uphold a municipality's blight determination.453 Even though
statutes generally require that only one factor indicative of blight be
present, in most blight determinations several statutory factors are
cited to support the blight determination. Courts rely on many similar
factors in reviewing blight determinations. The specific state statutory
definition of blight plays a role in a court's decision, and the court also
reviews and relies on decisions from other jurisdictions. Because of the
similarities in statutory definitions and a court's construction and ap-
plication of those definitions, decisions from other jurisdictions may
affect the construction of Chapter 353 by the Missouri courts. Each
factor discussed below is one commonly relied on by courts in their
review of a legislative determination of blight.
1. Diverse Ownership
In Stahl v. Board of Finance of Paterson, the New Jersey Superior
Court upheld a determination of blight based on diverse ownership of
452. Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 369, 142 A.2d 837, 842, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55-21); see also Levin v. Town-
ship Comm., 57 N.J. 508, 513-14 n.1, 274 A.2d 1, 5 n.1, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 803
(1971) (citing other similar state statutory provisions).
453. Levin v. Township Committee of Bridgewater, 57 N.J. 506, 274 A.2d 1, appeal
dismissed, 404 U.S. 803 (1971); Oliver v. City of Clairton, 98 A.2d 47, 51 (1953).
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property. 4 At that time the New Jersey statutory definition of blight
included lack of utilization because of diverse ownership that resulted
"in a stagnant and unproductive condition of land potentially useful"
among the conditions that indicated an area was blighted. The area in
question included 157 parcels of property with 144 owners making it
difficult to assemble tracts large enough for industrial expansion. The
renewal area also was a residential island completely surrounded by
industry.4"' The court upheld this blight determination on the grounds
that the New Jersey statute specifically included diverse ownership as
indicative of blighted conditions.4"6 Detailed findings concerning con-
ditions in the redevelopment area by the planning board executive staff
and a field survey facilitated the court's ability to uphold the blight
determination because these findings constituted "substantial evi-
dence" of blight conditions.45 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court
reached the same conclusion in Levin v. Township Committee of
Bridgewater418 and in addition, it reasoned that a blight determination
based on this factor allowed the city to assemble property without
spending years resolving title disputes.45 9 A California Court of Ap-
peals also upheld a blight determination based on diversity of owner-
ship as one of several factors in the blight declaration.4 °
2. Tax Delinquency
In Levin v. Township Committee of Bridgewater, the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated that "nonpayment of taxes and tax foreclosures
are themselves common incidents of a blighted area."'46 ' The redevel-
opment area encompassed 450 parcels, 268 of which were owned by
the township.462 In Levin, the municipality decided to acquire the
largely undeveloped property to build a large shopping mall which it
454. 62 N.J. Super. 562, 580, 163 A.2d 396, 406 (1960), aff'd, 69 N.J. Super. 242,
562, 580, 174 A.2d 238 (1961).
455. Id.
456. Id. at 579-80, 163 A.2d at 405-06.
457. Id. at 579, 582, 163 A.2d at 405-07.
458. 57 N.J. 506, 274 A.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 803 (1971).
459. Id. at 538, 274 A.2d 19.
460. Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal App.2d 777, 783,
266 P.2d 105, 110, 119, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954) (more than 500 parcels in
development area in separate ownership).
461. 57 N.J. 506, 534, 274 A.2d 1, 16, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 803 (1971).
462. Id. at 519, 274 A.2d at 7.
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had determined to be the best use for the property.463 Of the lots
owned by the municipality, tax foreclosures had resulted in flawed title
because of defective proceedings. In five instances, nobody acquired
title whereas other parcels had uninsurable title.4" The court relied on
the title flaws to uphold the blight determination particularly because
reforeclosure would not remedy the title defects.465 The court noted
that the New Jersey statute included as an indication of blight the lack
of use of the area that "resulted in tax delinquencies and [the munici-
pality's] widespread acquisition of land of good or doubtful title.,
466
In an earlier decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court also found the
tax delinquency status of six out of ten parcels in the development area
indicative of blight for the purposes of its redevelopment statute.46 7
3. Plot Irregularity
The California Supreme Court upheld a municipality's blight deter-
mination in In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project lB.468 Included
among the city commission's findings of blight was the inadequacy of
many parcels for development because of their shape, size or topo-
graphical character. 469 The California statutory definition of blight at
issue specifically included lots of "inadequate size for proper usefulness
and development." 470 In an earlier decision, a California Court of Ap-
peals upheld a blight determination by the San Francisco City Council,
based on a lack of development caused by the irregular form and shape
of plots drawn without regard to the physical contours of the
property.47
4. Fire and Safety Conditions
Municipalities commonly rely on fire and safety conditions in the
463. Id. at 517, 274 A.2d at 6-7.
464. Id. at 534, 274 A.2d at 16.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 538, 274 A.2d at 18.
467. Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 393, 142 A.2d 837, 856, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
468. 61 Cal.2d 21, 538, 39 Cal. Rptr. 74, cert denied, 379 U.S. 899 (1964).
469. Id. at 35 n.2, 389 P.2d at 547 n.2, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 82 n.2.
470. Id. at 34 n.2, 389 P.2d at 546 n.2, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 82 n.2 (quoting CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 33042 (West 1959)).
471. Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App.2d 777, 783-
84, 266 P.2d 105, 110, cert.denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954).
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redevelopment area to make blight determinations. In Foeller v. Hous-
ing Authority of Portland, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the Port-
land Housing Authority's blight determination in a constitutional
challenge to the statute,472 including a finding that residential struc-
tures in the redevelopment area constituted a fire hazard.47 3 The pri-
marily wooden structures were located in close proximity to industrial
and commercial establishments, subjecting the residences to unusual
hazards. City records indicated that the city received 100% more fire
calls in that area than the city's average.474
The California Supreme Court in In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal
Project 1B,4  also upheld the agency's blight determination which in-
cluded potential fire hazards as a blight indication. The determination
that a fire hazard existed differed from the determination in Foeller.
The Bunker Hill court found that the irregular topography of the rede-
velopment area contributed to the potential fire hazards.476 It held that
the "steep slopes and grades, sharp palisades and unusable lands" ham-
pered accessibility and required cable railroad and deep street cuts for
access.47 7 These conditions resulted in inadequate streets and traffic
bottlenecks that made access for fire control difficult. Other courts also




One of the most common elements used in blight determinations is
evidence of substandard or deteriorated housing or structures. Statu-
tory provisions usually define blighted areas as having buildings or
structures in a dilapidated or deteriorating condition. Statutes often
include the age of structures as a presumptive indication of blight.479
472. Foeller v. Housing Auth., 198 Or. 205, 218, 256 P.2d 752 (1953).
473. Id. at 218, 256 P.2d at 759.
474. Id.
475. 61 Cal.2d 21, 389 P.2d 538, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 899 (1964).
476. Id. at 35 n.2, 389 P.2d at 547 n.2, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 83 n.2.
477. Id.
478. See, e.g., Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App.2d
777, 782, 266 P.2d 105, 110 (evidence of blight included general use of coal oil heaters,
storage of inflammable materials and inadequate fire escapes), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897
(1954); Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 43, 326 S.W.2d 699, 702 (1959) (substan-
tially higher costs for fire calls in area).
479. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2) (Supp. 1988).
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In Wilson v. City of Long Branch,480 the New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld a blight determination partially based on the existence of sub-
standard structures. The statutory definition of blight at issue permit-
ted a blight determination when "buildings used as dwellings or the
dwelling accommodations... are substandard, unsafe, insanitary, di-
lapidated, or obsolescent, or possess any of such characteristics
.... ,,a8 In reaching its finding, the legislative body considered evi-
dence that 41 of the 71 dwellings in the proposed redevelopment area
were substandard because of serious disrepair of either the "outside
walls, roof, foundation, inside walls, floors or ceilings... or [because
they] lacked such major facilities as running hot water, a private bath
or a private interior flush toilet ....
Missouri courts also have upheld blight determinations under its
blight definition in Chapter 353 based on the adequacy of the struc-
tures within the area. In Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redevel-
opment Corp.,4 3 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a finding by the
Kansas City City Council that an area containing surface parking lots
and 14 commercial structures was blighted.484 The City Council based
its blight determination on evidence that most of the structures were
over 40 years old with three structures being 70 years old.485 Although
two of the structures had ratings of excellent, the remaining buildings
were rated as very poor, poor, fair, and good.48 6 In an earlier decision,
the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a blight determination relying on
480. 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837, cert denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
481. Id. at 392, 142 A.2d at 842.
482. Id. at 393, 142 A.2d at 855; see also in re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project
IB, 61 Cal.2d 21, 34, n.2, 389 P.2d 538, 547 n.2 (95% of structures constructed before
1919 and 63.4% of residential structures classified as substandard or slum and 20% as
poor), cert denied, 379 U.S. 899 (1964); Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v.
Hayes, 122 Cal. App.2d 777, 782, 266 P.2d 105, 110 (2000 structures in area blighted),
cert denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954); Stahl v. Board of Finance, 69 N.J. Super. 562, 576, 163
A.2d 396, 405 (1960)(board found area blighted based on personal inspection and age of
structures not inspected), aff'd, 69 N.J. Super. 243, 174 A.2d 238 (1961); Foeller v.
Housing Auth. of Portland, 198 Or. 205, 218-19, 234, 256 P.2d 752, 759, 766
(1953)(structures in area did not conform to minimum housing and building code re-
quirements); Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 42, 326 S.W. 2d 699, 702 (1959)(all
but seven of 256 structures in area were substandard with 80% beyond reasonable
rehabilitation).
483. 538 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. 1976)(en banc).
484. Id. at 322.
485. Id. at 323.
486. Id.
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evidence that 28 of the buildings in an area were deteriorated or sub-
standard even though the area comprised only fourteen percent of the
project area.487 In a third case, the Court held that a City Planning
Commission study which found sixty percent of the structures in a pro-
ject in need of significant repair sufficient to support a finding of
blight.
488
Courts generally defer to a legislative determination of blight and
uphold the findings; however, the Virginia Supreme Court overturned
a finding of blight under the state's then-existing statute that defined
blighted areas "as areas.., with buildings or improvements which, by
reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement
of design, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land
coverage, deleterious land use or obsolete layout, or any combination
of these or other factors, are detrimental .... . 489 The court reasoned
that the entire area was not blighted, and therefore, found that the de-
termination of blight was arbitrary.4"° Property owners in the area re-
cently had improved 37 of the 67 dwellings; all the residences had
running water and flush toilets, and all but one had electricity.491' Ac-
cording to the court, the whole area, and not isolated structures, had to
be blighted to satisfy the statute.
6. Street Design and Traffic Congestion
Local authorities have cited inadequate street design and traffic con-
gestion to support their blight determinations. In Redevelopment
Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes,492 wasteful street design unadapted
to the topography was one factor upon which the legislative body relied
to support its blight finding. The findings concerning street design in-
cluded evidence that 66 acres of mapped streets in the project area
were unpaved and undeveloped, only 1.4 acres of streets were paved,49
3
and mapped streets of usable grade were connected to streets of
487. Parking Sys., Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1974).
488. Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Greenberg, 594 S.W.2d 284, 288
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
489. Bristol Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 175, 93 S.E.2d
288, 292-93 (1956)(quoting VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-49 (1950).
490. Id. at 180, 93 S.E.2d at 295.
491. Id. at 179, 93 S.E.2d at 294.
492. 122 Cal. App.2d 777, 266 P.2d 105, 110, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954).
493. Id. at 783, 266 P.2d at 110.
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unusable grade.494 The California Supreme Court in In re Bunker Hill
Urban Renewal Project 1B 495 upheld a blight determination partially
based on the inadequacy of streets because of their width and steep
grades. The legislative body also found these conditions relevant to its
findings concerning potential fire and safety hazards in the project area.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also upheld a blight determination
that included a finding by the planning board that the project area con-
tained only one improved street.496
7. Economic Considerations
Many statutory definitions of blight allow for the determination to
depend upon findings of economic deterioration in the area. Cases con-
struing these provisions usually involve considerations of whether the
urban renewal statute allows a blight determination solely on the basis
that the land's current use is not its highest and best use. The statutory
provisions upon which legislative bodies rely to determine economic
blight vary in the manner in which they describe blight. Some describe
blight in terms of conditions while others describe it in terms of cause
and effect. For example, Chapter 353 describes a blighted area as one
which results in an economic liability because of the physical condi-
tions of the structures in the area.497 The New Jersey statute requires
no cause and effect findings. It is the mere existence of certain condi-
tions that constitutes blight.498 One provision of the New Jersey stat-
ute does provide for a finding that the blight occurred as a consequence
of existing conditions. 499 Both New Jersey provisions require that the
legislative body make findings on the specific conditions listed in the
statute when it makes its blight determination."° The California stat-
ute allows for blight determinations based upon economic reasons, de-
fining blight both in terms of conditions that exist in the area and in
terms of consequences of certain conditions. The provisions describing
494. Id.
495. 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 83 n.2, 389 P.2d 538, 547 n.2, 61 Cal.2d 21, 35 n.2, cert
denied, 379 U.S. 899 (1964).
496. Levin v. Township Comm., 57 N.J. 506, 526, 274 A.2d 1, 12, appeal dismissed,
404 U.S. 803 (1971).
497. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.020(2) (Supp. 1988).
498. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-21.6(b) (West 1976).
499. Id. § 40:55-21.6(e).
500. Stahl v. Board of Finance of Paterson, 62 N.J. Super. 562, 577, 163 A.2d 396,
404 (1960), aff'd, 69 N.J. Super. 243, 174 A.2d 238 (1961).
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economic liability as a cause and effect relationship do not require spe-
cific findings of causal conditions; they only require findings that the
resulting economic condition occurred." 1
In Stahl v. Board of Finance of Paterson,5 "2 a New Jersey court up-
held a blight determination, partially basing its decision on the then-
existing statutory provision for a blight finding where occupants aban-
doned or discontinued use of buildings previously used for manufactur-
ing or industrial purposes. Although the plaintiffs in that action did
not contest the specific finding by the Housing Authority that all the
industrial buildings in the area were entirely deteriorated or dilapi-
dated, the court held that the report by the planning board constituted
substantial evidence in support of its determination.5 0 3
The California Urban Redevelopment statute provides that an area
may be blighted when "economic dislocation, deterioration, or disuse,
resulting from faulty planning exists. '' 5' The statute also character-
izes a blighted area as one which exhibits a "prevalence of depreciated
values, impaired investments and social and economic maladjustments
reducing the capacity to pay taxes," and as one in which "a growing or
total lack of proper utilization of areas results in a stagnant and unpro-
ductive condition" of potentially useful land °. 5 5  The California Court
of Appeals upheld a blight determination based on these two latter
statutory definitions of blight in Redevelopment Agency of San Fran-
cisco v. Hayes. °6 The court found a "compelling economic need"
where a shortage of land required the use of unproductive land for
"dwelling and public places."5 °7 The court relied on evidence that
eighty-five percent of the land in the project area was vacant land and
had fallen into economic disuse because private enterprise refused to
develop the area without government assistance. Evidence suggested
that the inadequacy of streets and subdivisions in the area caused eco-
nomic dislocation. 8 Although the court stated that no single blight
501. See In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB, 61 Cal.2d 21, 35 n.2, 389
P.2d 538, 546 n.2, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 82 n.2, (Cal.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 899 (1964).
502. 62 N.J. Super. 562, 163 A.2d 396 (1960), aff'd, 69 N.J. Super. 243, 174 A.2d
238 (1961).
503. Id. at 578, 174 A.2d at 405.
504. In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project 1B, 61 Cal. 21, 35 n.2, 389 P.2d 538,
546 n.2, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 82 n.2, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 899 (1964).
505. 122 Cal. App.2d 777, 796, 266 P.2d 105, 118, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954).
506. Id. at 798, 266 P.2d at 119.
507. Id. at 799, 266 P.2d at 119.
508. Id. at 797, 266 P.2d at 118-19.
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element would constitute a sufficient basis for the use of the eminent
domain power, it found that a combination of circumstances "demon-
strate[d] the compelling community economic need required"5"9 for the
exercise of the eminent domain power. In addition, the court rejected
the argument that because public agencies held sixty-five percent of the
property, the reason for the property's disuse was a lack of opportunity
for private development ."o
In Sweetwater Valley Civic Association v. National City,5" the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court overturned a blight determination under its state
law by analyzing the statutory requirement that the property be an
economic or social liability.5 12 The court looked at blight determina-
tion under the statute as a two step process: first, the area must be an
economic or social liability to the community that requires redevelop-
ment and, second, one of the characteristics of blight listed in the stat-
ute must exist. 513 The legislative body declared the 130-acre area,
which included a 115-acre golf course, blighted, and approved the re-
development plan to construct a 70-building shopping center on the
site.514 In its opinion, the court noted that golf had increased in popu-
larity, that "no evidence [existed] that recent changes [had] reduced
either membership or revenues," and that the owners of the proposed
redevelopment project intended to build another golf course nearby.5 15
The court held that the property was neither an economic nor social
liability and that drainage or soil problems on the golf course poten-
tially burdened the property, but did not put an end to its economic
use.5 16 It stated that to sustain a blight determination it is "not suffi-
cient to merely show that the area is not being put to its optimum
use." '5 17 Instead, blight determinations must be made on the basis of
the property's existing use and not its potential alternative use.51 8
509. Id. at 797, 266 P.2d at 118.
510. Id. at 798, 266 P.2d at 119. See also Oliver v. City of Clairton, 374 Pa. 333,
342, 98 A.2d 47, 52 (1953)(municipalities have wide scope under urban redevelopment
statutes to rebuild areas that no longer meet economic and social needs of modem life).
511. 18 Cal.3d 270, 555 P.2d 1099, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859 (Cal. 1976)(en banc).
512. Id. at 278, 555 P.2d at 1104, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
513. Id. at 277, 555 P.2d at 1103, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
514. Id. at 273, 555 P.2d at 1100, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
515. Id. at 273, 555 P.2d at 1101, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
516. Id. at 278, 555 P.2d at 1104, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
517. Id. at 277, 555 P.2d at 1103, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
518. Id. at 278, 555 P.2d at 1104, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
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In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the statements in
Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes that "'one man's
land cannot be seized by the Government and sold to another man
merely in order that the purchaser may build upon it a better house or
a house which better meets the Government's idea of what is appropri-
ate or well-designed.'" The use of the eminent domain power under
the redevelopment statute should be confined to instances in which
"'the blight is such that it constitutes a real hinderance to the develop-
ment of the city and cannot be eliminated or improved without public
assistance.' ""9 This demonstrates an extreme case in which courts
will intervene and overturn a blight determination. Although courts
often willingly uphold these determinations when the proposed project
envisions a higher use, they might not do so when the purpose behind
the declaration is to put an economically viable area to a higher and
better use.
8. Crime Rate and Disease
A factor contained in most statutory definitions of blight is the crime
rate and prevalence of disease. The rate of juvenile delinquency is
often cited in blight studies. In Foeller v. Housing Authority of Port-
land,520 the court upheld a blight study that noted that the rate of
juvenile delinquency per 1,000 minors was seven and one-half times
greater in the project area than in the city as a whole. The blight study
also noted that the crime rate in the development area exceeded by
eight times the crime rate in the city as a whole.521 The Oregon statute
at issue included as one of its indications of blight an area "with build-
ings or improvements which, by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding,
lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, deleterious land use, or
any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety,
health, morals or welfare of the community., 5 22 The court relied on
this definition to uphold the blight determination partially based on the
area's crime rate. It found that under this statutory provision the exist-
ence of these factors were the underlying conditions that caused the
area to become blighted.523 The court also stated that the effects of
blight "do not confine themselves to the area [but] spread into the en-
519. Id. at 273, 555 P.2d at 1103, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
520. 198 Or. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953).
521. Id. at 220, 256 P.2d at 760.
522. Id. at 224, 256 P.2d at 762.







In Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes,52 5 a California
District Court of Appeals examined blight determinations made for
two project areas. The city council had found that one of the areas had
extreme overcrowding, three and one-half times higher than the overall
city.526 The city council found that forty percent of the dwelling struc-
tures within the area housed twice as many families than originally
planned. 27 The court held that the council's decision that the area was
a "slum area" was reasonable. 2 In In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal
Project lB,5 29 the California Supreme Court also upheld a blight deter-
mination partially based on overcrowding. The blight findings de-
scribed the overcrowding in terms of the number of structures on the
land instead of the number of inhabitants in the dwellings. 3 ° The leg-
islative body based its findings on the fact that the structures were built
prior to planning and zoning requirements and resulted in inadequate
yard areas, light, air and privacy.53 1 The study also stated that the
overcrowded condition hampered the prevention of fire.5 32 In may in-
stances, the original builders had constructed many structures on the
lot lines and the eaves of one building overhung the eaves of another.
5 33
10. Residential Property Surrounded by Commercial and Industrial
Uses (Incompatibility of Uses)
A lack of planning at the time of initial construction of structures
and a change in the use of areas may cause many residential areas to
become surrounded by commercial and industrial areas. Local author-
524. Id.; see also Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 326 S.W.2d 699
(1959)(disproportionately high percentage of arrests for intoxication, treatment rate for
venereal disease and costs of police and fire service).
525. 122 Cal. App.2d 777, 266 P.2d 105, cert denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954).
526. Id. at 782, 266 P.2d at 110.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 790, 266 P.2d at 114.
529. 61 Cal.2d 21, 35, 389 P.2d 538, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 899
(1964).
530. Id. at 35 n.2, 389 P.2d 547 n.2, 37 Cal. Rptr. 83 n.2.
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ities cite pockets of residential areas in commercial and industrial areas
as additional evidence that an area is blighted. In Stahl v. Board of
Finance of Paterson,534 the report of the planning board described the
project area as a "residential island completely surrounded by indus-
try."' 535 The blighted area itself contained forty-two percent land used
for residential purposes, nineteen percent for industrial and one percent
for commercial.5 36 Although the blighted area was predominately resi-
dential, it was within a large industrial area.537 The report found that
these conditions benefited neither industry nor residences.5 38  The
court found that the blight findings fell within the New Jersey statute
at issue which defined blight inter alia as "deleterious land use or obso-
lete layout.
539
In Oliver v. City of Clairton,5" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court up-
held a blight determination which included among its findings that in-
dustry, commercial uses and residences were closely mixed and
intermingled. 541 The city originally zoned the blighted area for manu-
facturing, but the lots in their present condition were not wide enough
to accommodate a minimum manufacturing plant. The planning com-
mission determined that the area's conditions were "to the great detri-
ment of all" and was "socially and economically undesirable" within
the then-existing statutory definition of blight. 42
Property conversion to a use different than the one for which it origi-
nally was intended also indicates blight conditions. As commercial ar-
eas of cities moved, owners often abandoned their buildings or
converted them to a different use, such as converting a department
store to a warehouse. 543 Today, many cities encourage the reuse of
structures in an attempt to revitalize older or deteriorating urban areas.
Where structures are sound, individuals convert them from industrial
534. 62 N.J. Super. 562, 163 A.2d 396 (1960), aff'd, 69 N.J. Super. 243, 174 A.2d
238 (1961).
535. Id. at 580, 163 A.2d at 406.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 569, 163 A.2d at 399.
538. Id. at 580, 163 A.2d at 406.
539. Id.
540. 374 Pa. 33, 98 A.2d 47 (1953).
541. Id. at 340, 98 A.2d at 51.
542. Id.




uses to residential lofts or "commercial shop aggregates." 5" Private
property owners accomplish these conversions, and municipalities as-
sist the conversions by encouraging the activity and allowing conver-
sions to uses outside the applicable zoning or subdivision regulations
for the area.54 5 Problems with conversions arise when private parties
act outside of municipal supervision. When improperly converted, the
converted structures may support a blight determination. In In re
Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project 1B, the legislative body cited an
incompatible mixture of residential, commercial and industrial uses, as
well as structures originally intended for one use converted for other
purposes among its findings in support of the blight determination.
5 46
Conversion occurs not only when specific structures are converted to
different uses, but also when the entire area changes from its original
use to a different use. The Oregon Supreme Court described such an
area in terms of the neighborhood's losing "its old character as residen-
tial property and ... struggling against obsolete planning to adapt itself
to industrial purposes. '5 47 The court held that because of this change,
the proposed development area had sunk "into a substandard condi-
tion."'5 48 The blight study described the area as surrounded on three
sides by industry and one that had "non-residential establishments...
scattered promiscuously throughout the area." '54 9 Dwellings intermin-
gled with commercial and industrial establishments occupied eighty-six
percent of the blighted area.550 The court stated that the area had un-
dergone a conversion from residential use to commercial use and that
the original platting of the area hampered this conversion. 5 It also
found that this conversion created grave fire hazards because of the
nature of the industries and their location alongside residences. 52
544. Id. at 81.
545. Id.
546. 61 Cal.2d 21, 34 n.2, 389 P.2d 538, 547 n.2, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 83 n.2, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 899 (1964).
547. Foeller v. Housing Auth. of Portland, 198 Or. 205, 253, 256 P.2d 752, 775
(1953).
548. Id.
549. Id. at 217, 256 P.2d at 758.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 262, 256 P.2d at 779.
552. Id.
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11. Conclusion
Although courts consider many different factors in determining
whether to uphold a municipal authority's blight determination, they
generally look at the statutory definition of blight to analyze whether
the blight determination falls within that definition. Courts willingly
construe statutory definitions broadly in order for findings to fall
within their ambit.553 Courts commonly cite the existence of substan-
dard housing and dilapidated structures within the proposed redevel-
opment area, often focusing on the age of the structures. Legislative
bodies also frequently rely upon the large number of tax delinquencies
within the area. These factors easily fall within even narrow statutory
definitions of blight. When the blight determination includes among its
findings such factors as plot irregularity, traffic conditions and inade-
quate street design, it usually does so pursuant to specific statutory pro-
visions that include them as conditions of blight. One court stated that
while one factor may not be "sufficient to justify the taking by eminent
domain," the combination of factors and the need for governmental
intervention to develop the area justify the condemnation of the
area.
554
Courts rarely overturn a blight determination. Those cases where
the courts have reversed that finding are ones in which either no evi-
dence supported the blight finding or the evidence presented contra-
dicted that finding. For example, in Bristol Redevelopment & Hous.
Auth. v. Denton, the court overturned the blight determination because
the legislative body did not look at the area as a whole. 55 It acknowl-
edged that some structures needed repair but nevertheless found that
the existence of some substandard structures did not support the blight
determination.5 56 In that case, the court held that the determination
was against "the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
557
553. See Oliver v. City of Clairton, 374 Pa. 333, 342, 98 A.2d 47, 52 (1953)(stating
that urban redevelopment laws are distinguishable from housing authority laws and
were "intended to give wide scope to municipalities in redesigning and rebuilding such
areas . . .").
554. Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App.2d 777, 798,
266 P.2d 105, 119, cert denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954).
555. 198 Va. 171, 179, 93 S.E.2d 288, 294 (1956).
556. Id
557. Id. at 180, 93 S.E.2d at 295. The California Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion in Sweetwater Valley Civic Association v. National City, 18 Cal.3d 270, 277,
555 P.2d 1099, 133 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1976)(en bane). The court refused to uphold the
determination that a profitable golf course was a blighted area, resting its holding on the
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C. Land That May Be Included Within the Blighted Area
1. Vacant Land
Blight presents two issues in connection with vacant land. Vacant
land, itself may be blighted, or vacant land that is not blighted may be
included in the project area to facilitate redevelopment of the area as a
whole. Many problems with blighted land occurred as a result of pre-
mature and poorly planned subdivisions of land, particularly in the
1920s.5 58 This idle land led to tax delinquencies and resulted in con-
cern over the social and economic impacts caused by the existence of
vacant land.559 In recognition of this problem, the Housing Act of
1949 and some state statutes specifically authorized the redevelopment
of "open and predominantly open land." 5" The fact that legislative
bodies make blight determinations on an area-wide basis also may re-
sult in the inclusion of unblighted vacant land in the blighted area.
Statutes generally define blight in terms of a "blighted area., 56 1 Courts
have relied on these statutory definitions to hold that vacant land may
be properly included within a blighted area. For example, the New
Jersey statute includes in its definition of blighted area any unimproved
vacant land that "has remained so for a period of ten years."'5 62 In
Levin v. Township Committee of Bridgeport, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that its existing state statutory provision could include rural
principle that blight determinations are not for the purpose of putting property to its
optimum use. Id. at 277, 555 P.2d at 1103, 133 Cal. Rptr. 863.
558. Jones, Local Government Organization in Metropolitan Areas: Its Relation to
Urban Redevelopment, in THE FUTURE OF CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 514
(C. Woodbury ed. 1953).
559. Id. at 515-16.
560. Id. at 514.
561. See Parking Sys., v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518
S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1974); State on inf Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment
Auth. of Kansas City, Mo., 270 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Mo. 1954) (en banc); Maryland Plaza
Redevelopment Corp. v. Greenberg, 594 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Wilson
v. City of Long Branch, 21, N.J. 360, 369, 142 A.2d 837, 842, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873
(1958); Jersey City Chapter of Property Owner's Protective Ass'n v. City Council of
Jersey City, 55 N.J. 86, 89, 259 A.2d 698, 700 (1969); Redevelopment Agency of San
Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App.2d 777, 790, 266 P.2d 105, 114, cert. denied, 348 U.S.
897 (1954); Oliver v. City of Clairton, 374, Pa. 333, 342, 98 A.2d 47, 52 (1953); Miller v.
City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 374, 392, 378 P.2d 464, 475 (1963); see also Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 353.020(2) (Supp. 1988).
562. Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 369, 393, 142 A.2d 837, 842, 855
(28.4 acres of unimproved property included within blighted area), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 873 (1958).
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and suburban areas within a blighted area.163 The court stated that an
area need not be a slum to be the subject of redevelopment and author-
ized a plan to turn a "predominantly vacant, poorly developed area
into a site for commercial structures." 5  It upheld the governing
body's determination that the highest and best use of the property
would be for a shopping center or mall and declared the suburban area
blighted.1
65
Courts also have found that blight determinations extend to air
rights. In The Jersey City Chapter of Property Owner's Protective Ass'n
v. City Council of Jersey City,5 66 the court first found that air space
constituted an estate in land and, consequently, that it fell within the
statute. 67 It reasoned that the legislature's use of the general term
"land" did not evince "the shortsighted purpose of excluding the space
above railroad tracks and the like as a proper subject of a blight or
renewal determination."
5 68
Missouri courts also have found the blighting of vacant land to be
within the purposes of its urban redevelopment statute. Rather than
holding that vacant land may be blighted, the Missouri courts have
upheld the inclusion of vacant land in a redevelopment project as nec-
essary to the success of a project. Nothing in Chapter 353, however,
prohibits the blighting of vacant land based on the need to redevelop
(or develop in the first instance) the unproductive property.
In State on Inf Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth.
of Kansas City, Missouri,5 69 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the
city may include vacant land within areas found to be blighted. The
court stated that the purpose of the urban redevelopment statute was to
clear and develop blighted and insanitary areas and that it may be nec-
essary "in certain instances to acquire ... vacant land which, but for
being within the area, would not be blighted or insanitary" in order to
ensure effective redevelopment.570 Furthermore, the court stated that
denying the acquisition of vacant land could defeat the purposes of the
563. 57 N.J. 506, 514, 274 A.2d 1, 5, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 803 (1971).
564. Id.
565. Id. at 517, 538, 274 A.2d at 7, 18.
566. 55 N.J. 86, 259 A.2d 698 (1969).
567. Id. at 98-99, 259 A.2d at 705.
568. Id.
569. 270 S.W.2d 44, (Mo. 1954)(en banc).
570. Id. at 53.
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legislation in some instances.571
In Parking Systems, Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment
Corp., the Missouri Supreme Court also held that neither the total area
nor any particular portion of a proposed redevelopment area needs to
constitute a slum for it to be blighted under the urban redevelopment
statute. 72 It found that the power to declare an area blighted included
examining vacant land not in itself blighted that was located within the
redevelopment area.573 The court decision upheld the blighting of
open land that comprised forty-nine percent of the redevelopment
area.
574
Although the court in Parking Systems did not rely on the Missouri
statutory provision, those provisions specifically allow for the inclusion
of "any real property, whether improved or unimproved... which is
deemed necessary for the effective clearance, replanning, reconstruc-
tion or rehabilitation of the area of which such buildings, improve-
ments or real property form a part. ' 5 75 The plaintiffs argued that the
condemnation of the forty-nine percent vacant land was "in excess of
that necessary for the public benefit of 'clearance of blight.' ,576 The
court held that all the land, including the vacant land, was part of the
redevelopment plan, and that it was "as essential to acquire the land
now vacant as it [was] to acquire the land upon which there [was] a
structure.,
5 77
2. Unblighted Structures Within Blighted Area
The courts uphold blight determinations that include sound struc-
tures within the project area with the rationale that blight is to be at-
tacked on an area-wide basis.578 For example, in In re Bunker Hill
571. Id.
572. 518 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1974).
573. Id. at 15.
574. Id. at 15-16.
575. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.020(1) (Supp. 1988).
576. Parking Sys., Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518
S.W.2d 11, 21 (Mo. 1974).
577. Id.
578. See In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB, 61 Cal.2d 21, 389 P.2d 538,
37 Cal. Rptr. 74, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 899 (1964); Housing & Redevelopment Auth. of
Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259 Minn. 1, 104 N.W.2d 864 (1960);
Levin v. Township Comm. of Bridgewater, 57 N.J. 506, 274 A.2d 1, appeal dismissed,
404 U.S. 803 (1971); Lyons v. City of Camden, 48 N.J. 534, 226 A.2d 625 (1967); Stahl
v. Board of Finance of Paterson, 62 N.J. Super. 562, 163 A.2d 396 (1960), aff'd, 69 N.J.
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Urban Renewal Project JB, the California Supreme Court upheld the
blighting of an area that included apartment houses that were not sub-
standard but which created a barrier separating the redevelopment
area."' The court included the property because the ordinance at is-
sue allowed the redevelopment of unblighted property that was "neces-
sary for the effective redevelopment of the area."58 In reaching its
decision, the court analogized zoning ordinances. 581 It stated that the
line of demarcation must be drawn at some point and refused to substi-
tute its judgment for the legislative body.
5 82
The New Jersey Supreme Court also held that the inclusion of un-
blighted areas within the project area was proper because planning
boards have "the broad statutory authorization to attack the problem
of blight on an area rather than a structure-by-structure basis. 5183 The
court would not let the presence of isolated useful parcels alter a legis-
lature's blight declaration or exclude such parcels from the blighted
area. 84 Courts apply this rationale to sound office buildings within the
plan area on the basis that the building would not blend aesthetically
with the development and that its rehabilitation would be costly and
destroy the structure's historical value.585
Super. 242, 174 A.2d 238 (1961); Sorbino v. City of New Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super.
554, 129 A.2d 473 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1957); Foeller v. Housing Auth. of Port-
land, 198 Or. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953); Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 326
S.W.2d 699 (1959); Bristol Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93
S.E.2d 288 (1956); Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash.2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963).
579. 61 Cal.2d 21, 46-47, 389 P.2d 538, 554, 556, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 90, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 899 (1964).
580. Id. at 49, 389 P.2d at 556, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
581. Id
582. Id.
583. Lyons v. Camden, 48 N.J. 524, 535-36, 226 A.2d 625, 631 (1967).
584. Levin v. Township Comm. of Bridgewater, 57 N.J. 506, 274 A.2d 1, 19 (citing
Lyons v. Camden, 226 N.J. 524, 226 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1967)), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S.
803 (1971). See also Stahl v. Board of Finance of Paterson, 62 N.J. Super. 562, 163
A.2d 396, 407 (1960)("The fact that the area found to be blighted may include a
number of sound structures or buildings, or even that it includes structures which are
not substandard, does not vitiate the governmental action."), aff'd, 69 N.J. Super. 242,
174 A.2d 238 (1961); Sorbino v. New Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super. 554, 129 A.2d 473, 483
(1957)(statute deals with areas and not individual properties).
585. Housing & Redevelopment Authority of Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Metro-
politan Co., 259 Minn. 1, 5, 16, 104 N.W. 2d 864, 868, 875 (1960)(upholding blighting
of twelve story office structure built in 1890); see also Bristol Redevelopment & Hous.
Auth. v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93 S.E. 2d 288, 294 (1956)(overtured blight determina-
tion on grounds that area as a whole not blighted).
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Missouri courts also have held that sound structures and parking
lots within the redevelopment area may be properly included in the
blight determination. In State on Inf Dalton v. Land Clearance for
Redevelopment Authority,586 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the
condemnation of sound structures under Chapter 99 was proper since
the purpose of the statute was to attack areas of blight. In Parking
Systems, Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., the Mis-
souri Supreme Court upheld a Chapter 353 blight determination re-
garding an area in which forty-seven percent of the property consisted
of surface parking lots.5 87 It found that Chapter 353 attacked blight on
an area wide basis and, therefore, the surface parking areas did not
defeat the blight determination. 8 In Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civic
Plaza Redevelopment Corp., the Missouri Supreme Court again upheld
a blight determination against an attack that the blight determination
was arbitrary and capricious because the area was not blighted. 8 9 The
plaintiff argued that the area was not blighted because roughly forty-
five percent of the area was used for surface parking lots.590 In this
instance, the court deferred to the legislative determination of blight
for the purposes of the statute.5 91
In Schweig v. City of St. Louis, 592 the Missouri Court of Appeals
reiterated the Missouri Supreme Court's holding that a city may in-
clude vacant land within the redevelopment area. It also considered
whether unblighted structures could be included in the blighted area.
The plaintiffs were adjoining property owners who challenged the
blight determination on the grounds that the blighted area included
seven unblighted structures.593 After holding that the adjoining prop-
erty owners had standing to challenge the city's blight declaration,
5 94
the court then adopted the Missouri Supreme Court's holding in Park-
ing Systems, Inc. that a determination is proper even when the blighted
586. 270 S.W.2d 44, 53 (Mo. 1954) (en bane).
587. Parking Sys., v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518 S.W.2d
11, 14, 16 (Mo. 1974).
588. Id. at 15, 16.
589. 538 S.W.2d 320, 321 (Mo. 1976)(en banc), cer denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976).
590. Id. at 322.
591. Id. at 324.
592. 569 S.W.2d 215, 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
593. Id. at 219, 220.
594. Id. at 223.
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area includes sound structures. 95 In addition, the court specifically
relied on the statutory provision that allows for the inclusion of un-
blighted structures within the redevelopment area where it is necessary
to redevelop the area.596 In Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v.
Greenberg, the Missouri Court of Appeals again upheld a blight deter-
mination against an argument that the area itself contained property
that was not blighted.597 As in Schweig, the court relied on both the
statutory provision that specifically allows for the inclusion of this
property,598 and on the earlier cases holding that a declaration of blight
is proper even though the blighted area contains structures "which
would not fall within the definitional ambit of blight."
599
D. Standard of Review Applied to Blight Determinations
Missouri courts will overturn a blight determination only when they
find that the determination was arbitrary and capricious, induced by
fraud, collusion or bad faith, or that the city exceeded its powers.'
This standard of review is based on the characterization of a blight
determination as a legislative act.6" This characterization gives the
ordinance adopting the determination presumptive validity; however,
this presumption is rebuttable and a court may overturn the determina-
tion if it finds that the city acted in a clearly arbitrary manner.6°2 The
Missouri Supreme Court discussed the standard of review in Annbar
Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp.,6°3 where the plaintiff
challenged the Missouri urban redevelopment statute and respective
city ordinance on grounds that they violated the United States and
595. Id. at 227.
596. Id.
597. 594 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
598. Id at 288.
599. Id.
600. Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 538 S.W.2d 320,
324 (Mo.) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); Parking Sys., Inc. v. Kansas City
Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1974); State on Inf. Dalton
v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. of Kansas City, 270 S.W.2d 44, 52 (Mo.
1954) (en bane); Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Greenberg, 594 S.W.2d 284,
287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Schweig v. City of St. Louis, 569 S.W.2d 215, 223 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978).
601. Parking Sys., Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518
S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1974).
602. Id. at 16.
603. 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1965) (en bane), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1966).
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Missouri Constitutions. They argued that the restrictions imposed
upon the redevelopment corporation did not ensure that the public
purpose of the statute would be fulfilled.6° 4 The court held that the
restrictions on the redevelopment corporation's earnings provided for
in the ordinance were sufficient to assure that the redevelopment would
meet the public purpose requirement of the federal and state constitu-
tional provisions." °5 In reaching its decision, the court characterized
the city council's means of "restriction and assurance of accomplish-
ment of the public purpose" as legislative. It then stated that this legis-
lative determination "whether wise or unwise, cannot be affected by the
courts unless it appears upon allegation and clear proof that [it] was
arbitrary or was induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith. ' ' 6
In Parking Systems, Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment
Corp., the court relied on the language in Annbar and applied the pres-
entation of validity to a blight determination." It then held the legis-
lative body's decision reasonable against plaintiffs' arguments that
structural deficiencies alone could not support a blight determination
and that the blighted area included vacant land and land used for park-
ing lots." 8 It also held that although only a certain percentage of the
structures were deteriorated, it did not constitute grounds for overturn-
ing the blight determination "without evidence compelling a finding of
unreasonableness."6' In addition, the court held that it would give
deference to the legislative determination that the area was blighted
and would not "interfere with a discretionary exercise of judgment by
the [legislative authority] unless it [was] clearly erroneous and
unreasonable.
' 6 10
Whether the blight determination is arbitrary turns on the facts of
each case and requires that the court review the findings of the legisla-
tive authority to determine whether those findings provide some basis
for the determination. 611 The burden of proving that the legislative
604. Id. at 649-50.
605. Id. at 650.
606. Id.
607. 518 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1974).
608. Id. at 16-17.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 19.
611. Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 538 S.W.2d 320,
324 (Mo.) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976).
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authority acted arbitrarily is upon the challenging party.6 12 In Allright
Missouri, Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corp., the Missouri
Supreme Court again upheld a blight determination. The court re-
viewed the evidence before the city council that the majority of struc-
tures were over forty years old, that the condition of those structures
ranged from very poor to excellent and that the appraised valuations
were low. 613 Although the court found that the evidence upon which
the city council relied for its blight determination compelled neither a
clear conclusion that the area was or was not blighted, it held that "the
legislative body reasonably could have determined ... that the area
was 'blighted' within the meaning of applicable statutes and ordi-
nances." 614 Although the evidence which the legislative authority ex-
amined was not conclusive, the court found room for differences of
opinion and a reasonable basis for the blight determination sufficient to
uphold the authority's decision. 615 It then rejected plaintiffs' argument
that the planning commission's disapproval of the plan constituted
conclusive evidence that the area was not blighted and that redevelop-
ment was not necessary., 616 The court found that the recommenda-
tion did not bind the council because Chapter 353 vested authority to
make a blight determination solely in the city's legislative body and not
617nbt akn'Sseswith the planning commission. In both Parking Systems, Inc. and
Allright, the Missouri Supreme Court established a deferential standard
of review of blight determinations and indicated that courts should up-
hold determinations that are fairly debatable.
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Tierney v. Planned Indus-
trial Expansion Authority of Kansas City618 demonstrates the extent of
deference that courts will give to a legislative determination of blight.
In Tierney, the plaintiffs challenged a blight determination under the
Planned Industrial Expansion Act6 19 on grounds that the area was not
blighted.62° Plaintiffs presented evidence that streets and alleys com-
prised twenty-seven percent of the area and surface parking comprised
612. Id. at 324.
613. Id. at 323.
614. Id. at 324.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 323.
617. Id.
618. 742 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1987) (en bane).
619. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 100.300-.610 (1986).
620. Tierney, 742 S.W.2d at 151.
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an additional thirty-seven percent. The plaintiffs argued that "the
greater part of the property in the area cannot properly be described as
blighted" when more than half of the area was comprised of sound
structures.62 ' Despite the evidence, the court refused to "sit as a court
of appeal over the decisions of the council," and held that the plaintiffs
did not meet their burden of proof that the blight determination consti-
tuted "an arbitrary or unreasonable abuse of legislative authority.
6 22
It stated that the city council could conclude that the existence of
streets and parking lots constitute blight conditions when those uses
"consume valuable urban land" and inhibit "more economically in-
tense.., uses.",623 Although the Tierney court did not review the Ur-
ban Redevelopment Corporations Act, the decision vividly
demonstrates that it is virtually impossible for a property owner to
challenge successfully a blight determination, implying that in Mis-
souri the legislative authority need only find that the area can be put to
a higher and better use to avoid a court finding that its decision was
arbitrary and capricious.
In Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver,624 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado held that the party stated a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it alleged that the blight
determination resulted from collusion between the city and the devel-
oper. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants used the urban renewal law
to assist the developer to obtain properties it was unable to purchase.
The court held that the action was proper. It did not limit the plain-
tiffs' claim to an inverse condemnation action for just compensation for
the property because in this case they alleged that the defendants acted
illegally and fraudulently.625 The court stated that "the critical differ-
ence is that plaintiffs allege illegitimate conspiratorial action outside the
ambit of the public policy contemplated by the legislative branch when it
enacted statutes regarding condemnation."62 6 Although the court in
Oberndorf only decided whether plaintiffs stated a cause of action, the
decision arguably indicates that the actions of a legislative body when
it makes a blight determination must rise to the level of illegal conduct




624. 653 F. Supp. 304, 316 (D. Colo. 1986)
625. Id. at 315.
626. Id. (emphasis in original).
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E. Conclusion
Urban redevelopment statutes typically require that a legislative
body make a blight determination as a precondition to the approval of
a redevelopment project. For the most part, the statutory definitions of
blight are general and, therefore, give the city a great deal of discretion
in its determination of what constitutes a blighted area. These defini-
tions primarily emphasize the age and condition of structures; how-
ever, the discretion afforded by the statutes and the judicial deference
to those decisions permit the legislative authority to go beyond the
elimination of slums and blighted areas to the encouragement of eco-
nomic development. In order to challenge a blight determination after
Tierney and Oberndorf it is arguable that a property owner must prove
that the legislative body acted fraudulently or illegally. Because of this
judicial deference, a showing of arbitrariness or unreasonableness may
present an insurmountable barrier for the plaintiff challenging the
blight determination.
PART VI. CHAPTER 353 AND THE ELIMINATION OF BLIGHT
A. Refocusing the Discussion
This article has focused on the following issue: Whether Chapter
353 is blight driven, or does the statute's purpose extend to economic
development projects in areas that lack the traditional indicia of blight
and do not provide direct benefits to the urban poor? To resolve the
issue, this Article has attempted to develop a legislative history for
Chapter 353 and has examined in detail the public purpose doctrine
and the concept of blight.
B. Conclusions
Chapter 353 should not, as a legal matter, be viewed only as a blight
driven statute. In other words, it is inaccurate to suggest that the Mis-
souri legislature enacted Chapter 353 only to eliminate areas that
might meet a layperson's concept of blight and for constructing hous-
ing. Instead, the legislature enacted a statute that is capable of doing
much more than eliminating areas characterized by a high percentage
of unsound structures. Four factors contribute to these conclusions.
First, while the legislative history of Chapter 353 does support the
conclusion that the legislatures originally intended, at least in part, to
remedy obvious cases of urban blight and to encourage housing con-
struction, the legislature did not restrict the statute to remedying blight
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in the form of areas predominated by dilapidated and deteriorating
structures. In addition, the legislature did not include in the 1945 stat-
ute any housing component whatsoever. The statute expressly defined
"redevelopment" to include "[t]he provision of such industrial, com-
mercial, residential or public structures and spaces as may be appropri-
ate." 62 7 Thus, only an extremely restrictive analysis of the statute
would limit Chapter 353 to only remedying blight in the traditional
sense by providing direct benefits, such as housing, to the urban poor.
Second, both the statutory definition of blight and the view that
blight is a socio-economic process rather than a set of static conditions
support the use of economic development for urban redevelopment
projects. Local governments have used urban redevelopment statutes
in a two-pronged attack on urban problems. 62 8 Local governments at-
tempt to attack the symptoms of urban deterioration while also at-
tempting to arrest the underlying economic conditions contributing to
that deterioration. By attempting to wage a battle on both fronts, local
governments have arguably been unsuccessful in bringing urban deteri-
oration under control.62 9
Third, it appears that legislators included blight determinations in
urban redevelopment statutes to support the use of the eminent domain
power in urban redevelopment projects. 630 The concept of public use
or purpose that purportedly limits the exercise of the eminent domain
power has greatly expanded since the late 1930s and early 1940s, how-
ever. Thus, a court's strict limitation on a local government's discre-
tion in making a blight determination would defeat redevelopment
when it is now clear that that determination is not necessary to support
the use of the eminent domain power.
The fourth and final factor that suggests that a blight determination
should not be an overly restrictive conditon on legislative power, indi-
cating that redevelopment statutes are not solely blight driven, is the
deference that courts give to legislative decisions regarding urban rede-
velopment. Implicitly, the courts recognize that legislative bodies are
more competent to determine the need for, and propriety of, urban
627. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(8) (Supp. 1988).
628. Greene, supra note 170, at 226-37.
629. Id. at 236-37.
630. Linhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
597 599 (1942); Note, Public Use, Private Use and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain,
58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 409, 413 (1983).
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
94 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 37:3
redevelopment projects.63 Thus, judicial deference results in provid-
ing local governments with a great deal of flexibility in dealing with
urban problems.
At the same time, however, the courts do provide a safety net by
making it possible to invalidate a blight determination or the use of the
eminent domain power when the government's conduct is egregious.
Courts in several states have invalidated legislative action when the
government did not comply with statutory requirements632 and have
upheld claims under the federal constitution when a property owner
alleges collusion of the government and the redevelopment
corporation.633
C. The Elimination of Blight and Public Policy
The legal conclusions reached in this Article should not be taken as
an endorsement for the policy decisions that underlie the use of urban
redevelopment statutes for purely economic development projects.
There is a substantial difference between suggesting that the use of stat-
ute is legal and suggesting that the use is good policy. Critics of the
economic development model argue that it often is unnecessary to pro-
vide Chapter 353 benefits for economic development projects, because
those projects would be undertaken without the benefits. Critics also
argue that projects often are not cost efficient in the long run and that
projects may have undesirable side effects. The most severe criticism of
Chapter 353 is that the statute, at least when used for economic devel-
opment projects, benefits an already privileged class at public expense.
The criticisms of the economic development model of urban redevel-
opment can be validated only through the examination of empirical
data. Even then, the data may be equivocal and inferences will need to
be drawn. This appraisal of the local government's use of Chapter 353
must, however, be left to the political process rather than judicial inter-
vention. If citizens feel that their government is misusing public re-
sources and powers, the citizens can exercise their displeasure at the
631. See Parking Sys. v. Kansas City Downtowns Redevelopment Corp., 518
S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1974); Levin v. Township Comm. of Bridgewater, 57 N.J. 506, 539,
274 A.2d 1, 18, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 803 (1971); Magleis v. Planning Bd., 173
N.J. Super. 419, 421, 414 A.2d 570, 572 (1980).
632. See e.g., Sweetwater Valley Civic Assn. v. National City, 18 Cal.3d 270, 278-
79, 555 P.2d 1099, 1103, 133 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976)(en banc)(refusal to uphold blighting
of profitable golf course); Bristol Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Dinton, 198 Va. 171,
180, 93 S.E.2d 288, 294 (1956)(area as a whole not blighted).
633. Oberndorfv. City & County of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304, 315 (D. Colo. 1986).
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ballot box. In addition, citizens can work to effect changes in the state
law and local ordinances. Indeed, recent controversy surrounding
Chapter 353 stimulated legislative changes.634 If the public is not com-
fortable with granting extensive benefits to urban redevelopment
projects that are justified in terms of economic development, then
amendments to Chapter 353 should be enacted to restrict local govern-
ment discretion when making blight determinations, determining the
extent to which tax benefits will be granted, or deciding whether it
should delegate its eminent domain power to a private corporation.
D. Summary
Courts should not narrowly construe Chapter 353 as a blight driven
statute. Although a blight determination is a prerequisite for project
approval under the statute, the courts should continue to give great
deference to a legislative finding of blight. The legislative history of
Chapter 353, the law on the public purpose doctrine, and the law relat-
ing to blight determinations support the conclusion that economic de-
velopment projects are within the original purposes of Chapter 353.
Those who object to this use can resort to the ballot box and, in eg-
gregious cases, can seek judicial invalidation of governmental action.
634. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 353.010, 353.020, 353.110.3 (1986&Supp. 1988); KANSAS
CITY, Mo. CODE §§ 36.5-36.10 (1986).
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